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This study investigates the effects of the 2008 financial crisis and stock market automation on 
the efficiency of the Botswana Stock Exchange (BSE). It makes use of the BSE All Share Index 
(ALSI) logged returns covering the time period 2005 – 2017. In addition, four distinct tests are 
employed to test for the change in market efficiency over time: runs test, unit root test, serial 
correlations test and variance ratio test. The study found resounding evidence to conclude 
that the 2008 financial crisis and stock market automation had a significant positive effect on 
the efficiency of the BSE. In addition, the BSE went from being inefficient to weak-form 
efficient due to the policies implemented by the government of Botswana and financial 
regulators as a direct reaction to the 2008 financial crisis, plus the continuous improvement 
of the Automated Trading System (ATS). To the author’s knowledge, this study is the first of 
its kind to test the impact of the 2008 financial crisis and automation of the trading system 
on the weak-form market efficiency of the BSE. As a result, this study provides an original and 
unique testimony on the effects of the 2008 financial crisis and the ATS on the efficiency of 
the Botswana Stock Exchange. Moreover, it offers an updated position of the BSE’s efficiency 
status following the recent developments to ensure that relevant legislation and effective and 
efficient trading systems are in place.  
  
Keywords: Botswana Stock Exchange; Efficient Market Hypothesis; 2008 Financial Crisis; 
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According to Fama (1970), a market is efficient if prices fully reflect all the available 
information. Alternatively, Fama’s (1970)’s assertion is that for markets to be efficient, asset 
prices should follow a random walk such that the direction of future prices becomes 
unpredictable. Hence, it is impossible for investors to profit from information that is already 
available. As a result of this assertion, Fama (1970)’s argument pioneered the efficient market 
hypothesis (EMH) theory research. To test Fama (1970)’s EMH theory, several studies used 
various methods to examine whether markets are efficient or not.  
 
Unfortunately, a review of studies testing the EMH theory shows that, so far, the results are 
mixed. However, some inconsistencies have also been observed in the results produced by 
the various methods used in previous studies. For example, the debate in prior studies shows 
that some methods are only suitable under certain conditions. This debate suggests that care 
should be taken when choosing the method to use for analysing market efficiency. In addition, 
a review of literature also shows that several anomalies which violate the EMH have been 
detected. These anomalies have been argued to distort the efficiency of the market.  
 
Apart from the anomalies, several other determinants of market efficiency have been 
discussed in prior studies. Some of these are related to automation and its effect on liquidity, 
transaction costs and flow of information, regulation and market condition. This study argues 
that the determinants of market efficiency play an important role for information to be fully 
reflected in asset prices such that investors cannot exploit it and generate excess returns. The 
two important determinants discussed in this study are the condition of the economy and the 




However, this study acknowledges that there are several other determinants that could be 
used to assess market efficiency. The choice of the two above is based on the location of this 
study and the developments that took place in the chosen location as discussed in subsequent 
sections of the study. This study uses Botswana as a location to empirically examine the weak-
form market efficiency on the Botswana Stock Exchange (BSE).  
 
Several developments have taken place in Botswana since the 2008 financial crisis. Due to 
these developments, this study seeks to investigate whether the implementation of financial 
regulations and stricter control policies on the BSE after the 2008 global financial crisis have 
had a positive impact on weak-form market efficiency. In addition, it further examines the 
impact of automation of the BSE in 2012, which became fully effective in 2013, on the weak-
form market efficiency. This study makes use of returns of the Botswana All Share Index for 
the period 2005 to 2017.  This study is motivated by several limitations in prior literature as 
discussed below. 
 
1.2 Limitations and Motivation for the Study 
 
A review of prior literature shows that there is a very limited number of prior studies that 
tests the weak-form market efficiency based on the BSE. The only well-referenced study on 
market efficiency is by Chiwira and Muyambiri (2012), who used market data covering the 
period 2004 – 2008. In their study, Chiwira and Muyambiri (2012) found that the BSE is 
inefficient at the weak-form and concluded that a number of improvements to market 
infrastructure and regulations were necessary in order to improve its efficiency.  
 
However, the study conducted by Chiwira and Muyambiri (2012) considered a short period, 
that is five years, and it is also dated as a number of regulatory and market infrastructural 
improvements have taken place since 2008. This study tests market efficiency for a period of 
12 years – between 2005 and 2017. This provides the longest period ever studied on the 
market efficiency of the BSE. In addition, it provides an excellent opportunity to assess 
whether regulatory and market infrastructural improvements have been sufficient in enabling 
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the BSE to become more efficient, or whether additional steps need to be undertaken to make 
the Botswanan stock market more efficient. 
 
Furthermore, there is no study that could be found which examines whether automation 
improves the weak-form market efficiency on the BSE, nor have there been studies conducted 
to test the effect of the 2008 financial crisis on the weak-form market efficiency on the BSE.  
In the same vein, there is limited research testing for weak-form market efficiency before and 
after the automation of trading on an exchange in developing countries, irrespective of the 
benefits that the automation system offers to investors relative to the manual system. A 
review of literature indicates that the majority of the studies regarding the effects of the crisis 
and automation on weak-form market efficiency are concentrated in developed markets. In 
addition, there is limited research that is focused on a small number of African markets. For 
example, there are few studies that focus on South Africa, Namibia, Kenya and Nigeria. Hence, 
this study provides a valuable enhancement to existing literature on the effects of a financial 
crisis and automation on market efficiency.  
 
Since most young stock exchanges use an open outcry system, which slows the flow of 
information, it is believed that a switch to an Automated Trading System (ATS) vastly improves 
the processing of information which, in turn, should improve market efficiency. Therefore, an 
analysis that covers the period before and after automation makes it possible to conclude 
whether an improvement in information processing and reconciliation brought about by 
automation improves market efficiency as well. Botswana forms a suitable case study due to 
its well-structured financial sector and the fact that the BSE is considered to be the third-
largest – and one of the fastest growing – stock exchange in Sub-Saharan Africa (Hoover, 
2013).  Furthermore, the fact that the BSE is a young stock exchange that has recently 
transitioned from a manual system to an automated system gives this study an opportunity 
to examine how efficient and effective the flow of information caused by the automation has 
impacted the weak-form market efficiency of the BSE. 
 
Moreover, prior studies do not examine market efficiency before, during and after the crisis. 
The efficiency of the market could be different depending on whether there is a crisis or not. 
Botswana recovered rapidly from the crisis, with its GDP growth rate increasing from -8% to 
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7% in a matter of two years (African Development Bank Group, 2012). In addition, the BSE 
reacted swiftly to the crisis by implementing the CSD and ATS, with the aim of improving 
trading experience and the efficiency of the market. This provides a suitable set-up to test the 
impact of the 2008 financial crisis, as well as the implementation of the CSD and ATS as a 
response to the crisis, on the weak-form market efficiency of the BSE.  
 
Adding to the above, previous studies do not use two complementary methods of assessing 
market efficiency in one study. This study follows an innovative approach of blending the 
2008 financial crisis and the implementation of the ATS and assessing whether these two 
events impacted market efficiency on the BSE. This study observes that market efficiency is a 
function of a blend of factors. Therefore, in this view, an inclusion of the impact of the crisis 
and automation on weak-form market efficiency in one study provides this study with an 
additional dimension to determine the drivers of market efficiency. 
 
All things considered, this study offers invaluable insight to domestic and foreign investors, 
as it provides them with an up-to-date revision of market efficiency on the BSE. 
 
1.3 Research Objectives and Questions 
 
The main objective of this study is to examine the impact of the 2008 financial crisis and stock 
market automation on weak-form market efficiency on the BSE. Specifically, the study seeks 
to address the following questions: 
(i) Did weak-form market efficiency improve during the 2008 financial crisis? 
(ii) Did the subsequent implementation of the ATS in 2012 improve weak-form market 
efficiency of the BSE? 
 
1.4 Formal Statement of Hypothesis 
 
This study seeks to test two different effects in relation to weak-form market efficiency. Thus, 




Hypothesis One:  
H0: Weak-form market efficiency on the BSE improved after the 2008 global    
financial crisis, with the implementation of the CSD 
H1: Weak-form market efficiency on the BSE did not improve after the 2008 financial 
crisis, with the implementation of the CSD 
Hypothesis Two: 
H0: Weak-form market efficiency on the BSE improved after the implementation of 
the ATS in 2012. 
H1: Weak-form market efficiency on the BSE did not improve after the 
implementation of the ATS in 2012. 
 
1.5 Organisation of the Study 
 
The remainder of the study is organised as follows: Chapter 2 provides the background to the 
study. Chapter 3 presents a review of literature while chapter 4 describes the data and 
research methodologies used for the study. Thereafter, chapter 5 presents the results and a 

















Botswana is Africa’s economic success story—with the highest cumulative GDP growth rate 
in the past five decades. This is evidenced by the fact that its GDP per capita has grown at an 
annual average of 10.08% since it attained its independence from Britain in 1966. 
Numerically, GDP per capita rose from $83 in 1966 to $7153 in 2016 (World Bank, 2018). As 
a result, Botswana has successfully transitioned from being a low-income to an upper-middle 
income country in five decades (Farole, 2015). A remarkable feat of this growth is that it 
helped to fuel the development of Botswana’s financial markets, including the stock 
exchange, into one of the fastest growing and most promising markets in Africa, despite the 
fact that they were virtually non-existent at the time of independence (Kohli, 2016). Similarly, 
Botswana has become the best-case scenario for stock market development and foreign 
investment in Sub-Saharan Africa for its relative political and economic stability, its 
outstanding efforts in eradicating poverty and in avoiding the resource curse which plagues 
most resource-rich countries in the region (Dening & Thomas, 2013:41).  
 
However, the 2008 financial crisis was the worst economic disaster since the Great 
Depression of 1929. The crisis led to the collapse of large financial institutions and severely 
weakened the entire US financial system. The bursting of the US housing bubble sent ripples 
of market disturbances, leading to global financial contagion. During that time, European and 
American banks were highly exposed to US mortgage loans as they had bought considerable 
amounts of collateralised mortgage debt. When defaults rose abruptly, these banks lost 
billions of dollars. Banks became cash-strapped to such an extent that even the interbank 
lending ceased overnight as banks started pulling back their international loans. This credit 
crunch led to a large number of financial problems in countries that relied heavily on 
international borrowing and those that had current account deficits. The contagion caused a 
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sharp drop in consumer confidence due to uncertainties regarding the state of the global 
economy, which led to reduced consumption as consumers were saving rather than spending. 
This affected businesses globally as the demand for goods and services – and their value – 
declined. Moreover, the demand for exports fell. As the demand for exports fell, many 
countries’ current account balances deteriorated further. Consequently, the crisis resulted in 
a global downturn in economic activity, leading to an increase in unemployment, a decrease 
in economic profits and sharp increases in governments’ budget deficits, especially for less 
economically-developed countries and emerging economies (Faola, 2016). By the beginning 
of 2009, most countries around the globe were in a recession. 
 
Due to the interconnectedness of the global banking system, even countries that were not 
exposed to mortgage loans were, at least indirectly, affected by the crisis. Botswana is a prime 
example of a country which was greatly affected by the crisis although its banks and pension 
funds held minimal securities associated to US mortgage debt (Goitsemang, 2008). Real GDP 
decreased by 6% while the growth rate was predicted to be 3.3% in 2009. The sharp 
contraction in output was driven by the fact that Botswana’s economy is primarily export-
dependent.  
 
The global decline in the demand for Botswana’s three main exports – diamonds, copper-
nickel and tourism – adversely affected its economy. In 2007, diamonds accounted for over 
50% of Botswana’s exports. However, the collapse in global demand for rough diamonds led 
to a 50% decline in diamond exports by the fourth quarter of 2008. Additionally, copper and 
nickel prices decreased by 80% in international markets during the same period, hence 
making their extraction unprofitable for Botswana’s miners (Jefferis, 2008). Granted that 
export earnings made up 40% of Botswana’s revenues, the commodity slump led to the worst 
current account deficit the country ever experienced since 1975. A consequence of this was 
that foreign exchange reserves decreased by 5.9% between 2007 and 2008 as efforts were 
made to stabilise the currency and fill the hole left by the widened current account deficit 
(Goitsemang, 2008).  
 
A consequence of the crisis was that most companies in Botswana slowed down operations 
due to lack of credit lines, long-term investment opportunities funds and a steep decline in 
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foreign direct investment. In addition, most companies in the industrial sector had postponed 
capital expenditure programmes to cushion operational losses (Kamidza, 2009). The closure 
of mines and scaling down of operations in the manufacturing sector resulted in a large-scale 
retrenchment of workers in the country. The consequence was a 28.6% increase in job losses 
between 2008 and 2010 in the mining and manufacturing sectors. Given that these two 
sectors employed 22% of total workers, the unemployment rate rose from 12.9% in 2008 to 
17.9% in 2010 (World Bank, 2017). During the same period, poverty rates increased by 2.5% 
(Southern Africa Resource Watch, 2008). Based on the above discussion, it can be concluded 
that the financial crisis had a considerable adverse socio-economic impact in Botswana. 
 
In addition, Botswana’s stock market experienced increased volatility and negative returns 
due to the 2008 financial crisis. All the major indicators of stock market health were negatively 
affected between 2007 and 2009. The stock market index’s performance declined by 18.5%, 
stock market capitalisation decreased by 44.7%, the P/E ratio decreased by 23% and the 
Price/Book ratio decreased by 35.3%. Similarly, there was a decline in the stock market 
liquidity over the same period. For example, the stock market turnover declined by 8% and 
the average daily turnover dropped by 9% (Botswana Stock Exchange [BSE], 2009).  
 
The main contributing factor to the deterioration of the health of Botswana’s stock exchange 
was the fact that 81% of stock market capitalisation is mostly made up of the mining and 
material sectors, which are highly exposed to the international markets, especially the 
developed economies (BSE, 2009). The sharp decline in the international prices of diamond 
and copper-nickel, coupled with a decline in global demand for the aforementioned 
commodities, steered the mining companies into enormous losses and a downscaling of 
operations. Naturally, as the share prices of local companies tumbled, the stock market 
capitalisation, and liquidity thereof, followed the same course.  
 
Owing to the advent and resulting impact of the financial crisis, many reforms were put in 
place in Botswana. For example, numerous financial reforms were implemented in the 
banking sector and capital markets in order to improve the productivity and efficiency of 
these markets, and to minimise any potential contagion effect of future crises. One of the 
major reforms that took place was when The Board of the Bank of Botswana approved the 
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implementation of the Basel II accords in 2016, in order to maintain close supervision of 
banks, ensuring that they do not take on excessive risks and to improve their disclosure 
policies (Bank of Botswana, 2015).  
 
In addition, the government invested in developing the capital markets in two ways. Firstly, 
they established the Central Depository Company of Botswana (CDCB) during the financial 
crisis in order to effect the electronic settlement of BSE listed securities and to hold those 
listed securities in electronic form (Ntshole, 2016). Secondly, the BSE launched its automated 
trading system (ATS) in 2012. This replaced a manual open outcry trading system and enabled 
investors both from Botswana and abroad to have access to an online trading system with 
automatic clearing and settlement. The objective was to make the BSE more visible and 
transparent, and to make trading more efficient (Minney, 2012). The dematerialisation of 
paper certificates was aimed at reducing the risk element associated with the manual clearing 
and settlement process. On the impact of automation, Hiran Mendis, the CEO of the BSE, 
stated that the system created more liquidity and attracted more domestic and foreign 
investors due to its facilitation of trade.  
 
Furthermore, the CEO of MillenniumIT, the company which installed the ATS, affirmed that 
their system allowed the BSE to offer more enhanced services, provide a better trading 
experience and, most importantly, make the stock market more efficient (MillenniumIT, 
2012). The establishment of both the CDCB and ATS claimed to have improved market 
efficiency, which begs the question: Have they practically improved market efficiency on the 
BSE? 
 
2.2 An Overview of the Botswana Stock Exchange (BSE) 
 
The BSE was constituted as the Botswana Share Market (BSM) in 1989. Before then, there 
was no formal exchange in Botswana and the BSM traded as an informal market with only 
five listed companies and one brokerage firm, namely Edwards & Co. (Pvt) Ltd (Carana 
Corporation, 2003). The BSM was assisted by the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange for its listing 
rules, member rules and all general rules. In order to encourage foreign investment, an 
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exchange committee was set up in 1990 with representatives from the private and public 
sectors which helped to formalise the stock exchange. After years of meticulous planning and 
deliberation, the BSM paved way for the establishment of the BSE in 1995 under the newly-
formed legislation of the Botswana Stock Exchange Act (Carana Corporation, 2003). 
 
The structure of the BSE has changed since its inception, with the number of listed companies 
having grown from 5 in 1989 to 44 in 2017. Furthermore, there is currently a recognisable 
diversification as representation on the BSE now ranges from wholesaling and retailing, 
financial services and insurance, banking, property, mining, security services, transport, 
tourism, energy and healthcare. In 2001, the BSE also introduced a Venture Capital board in 
order to assist companies wanting to raise start-up capital. Further developments took place 
on the BSE; including the listing of Botswana government bonds on the exchange in 2003 so 
as to develop the domestic capital market (Botswana Stock Exchange, 2017a). 
 
Another major milestone for the BSE was the development of market infrastructure. This 
infrastructure was developed as a response to the 2008 financial crisis. The BSE implemented 
the Central Securities Depository (CSD) in 2008 in order to bring quick and efficient clearing 
and settlement of trades and the reduction of risks associated with the former manual 
process. A major benefit was that settlement time shortened from T+5 (time plus 5 days) to 
T+3 (time plus 3 days) to conform to international standards, which in turn helped to reduce 
settlement risk. Subsequent to the implementation of the CSD, the BSE successfully 
implemented the ATS in 2012. This was done in order to support the BSE’s marketing 
initiatives by making it easier for both local and foreign investors to trade on the BSE and to 
make the exchange more efficient. The latest developments in the BSE come from the growth 
of more instruments, especially alternative investments, to give investors a greater variety of 
exchange-listed instruments. In addition, the BSE is working on establishing a risk-free yield 
curve, which will serve as a benchmark for future bond issues (Botswana Stock Exchange, 
2017a).  
 
In terms of the BSE technicalities, trading is conducted from Monday to Friday between 9:00 
a.m. and 4:00 p.m. The stock exchange handling fees are fixed at P15 per bought note and 
P10 per sold note. In terms of taxation, a 15% withholding tax is levied and there is no 
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capital-gains tax. Settlement of transactions occur 5 days (T+5) after the transaction is 
completed. Moreover, no foreigner can own more than 10% of issued share capital of a 
publicly-listed company, and foreign ownership for the free stock of a local company may not 
exceed 55%. In addition, the repatriation of funds is allowed up to P100 million (Carana 
Corporation, 2003). 
 
To sum up the above, the government of Botswana, financial regulators and the BSE took 
several steps to improve the informational efficiency of the domestic financial market. For 
instance, measures were taken to improve the BSE’s liquidity, increasing its appeal to local 
and international investors, increasing trading convenience, access to alternative investment 
products, reduction of costs, improvement of communication between traders and brokers, 
centralisation of securities and decreasing trading lags. Below is a summary of some of the 
policies that were implemented as a result of the 2008 financial crisis, and as a drive for 
improvement of the ATS:  
• The implementation of the CSD and the share dematerialisation for both domestic and 
foreign, stocks (BSE, 2009). 
• The Bank of Botswana improved the risk-based regulatory and supervisory system 
that prevented banks from engaging in excessively risky activities (Jefferis, 2010). 
• Implementation of the Basel I Banking rules in 2009 (Jefferis, 2010). 
• Privatisation of financial and banking state-owned institutions such as the Botswana 
Savings Bank and National Development Bank (Jefferis, 2010). 
• The introduction of liquid ETFs to the BSE (BSE, 2009). 
• The BSE introduced ETF Investor Schemes (BSE, 2009). 
• The BSE also reduced its minimum trading requirement securities from 100 units to 1 
unit (BSE, 2009). 
• The BSE sponsored six financial market courses, partnering with Geometric 
Progression CC of South Africa (BSE, 2010). 
• Creation of a bond market, with 36 immediate listings (BSE, 2010). 
• The introduction of the automated trading system (ATS) (BSE, 2013). 
• Introduction of limit orders, market orders and stop losses (BSE, 2013). 
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• Extension of regular trading sessions of the BSE, from 1 hour 45 minutes to 2 hours 45 
minutes (BSE, 2013). 
• The BSE improved their website, introduced internet-based trading and rolled out 
information dissemination through data vendors (BSE, 2013). 
• Implementation of the complete dematerialisation of listed securities (BSE, 2015). 
• The BSE significantly progressed with the centralisation, clearing and settlement of 
bonds listed in the BSE (BSE, 2016). The BSE partnered with an international bank – 
Saxo Bank – to give local investors access to international investment products (BSE, 
2016). 
 
Overall, the above measures had to be implemented to ensure the smooth function of the 
BSE. The BSE plays a pivotal role in Botswana’s financial system: it acts as an avenue on which 
government, quasi-government and private sector can raise debt and equity capital. To date, 
the BSE is one of Africa’s best-performing stock exchanges, averaging 24% aggregate return 
in the past decade. This has allowed the transformation of the BSE from an informal stock 
exchange to the third-largest stock exchange in terms of market capitalisation in Southern 

















CHAPTER 3 – LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter provides a review of the findings in prior literature on EMH theory. The review 
covers the theory of the EMH, types of market efficiency, determinants of an efficient market, 
market anomalies and their relationship to the EMH. It further provides a detailed discussion 
on empirical research on the EMH in both developed and developing markets. Empirical 
findings are separated in order to determine if there is any contrasting evidence on the 
findings between the studies conducted based on developing countries and those of their 
counterparts. The motivation behind this review is to envisage if country factors could be 
playing a role in determining the impact of the crisis and automation on weak-form market 
efficiency.  
 
Owing to the broadness of the research on EMH theory, the review of literature is divided 
into sub-sections. Section 3.2 provides a brief overview of the EMH theory. Section 3.3 
presents a review of the three different forms of the EMH. Section 3.4 reviews the 
determinants of an efficient capital market, while section 3.5 reviews some of the market 
anomalies discussed in prior studies that contradict the EMH. Section 3.6 reviews empirical 
evidence on the efficiency of the BSE. Section 3.7 presents a review of the effects of the 2008 
financial crisis on the efficient market hypothesis, while section 3.8 reviews literature on the 
impact of automation on the efficiency of a stock market. Thereafter, section 3.9 presents a 
summary of the chapter. 
 
3.2  Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) Theory 
 
Malkiel (1992) defines an efficient market as one which fully and correctly reflects all relevant 
information in determining a security’s price. Malkiel (2003) further asserts that when a piece 
of relevant information arises, the news spreads rapidly and gets immediately incorporated 
into the security prices. However, Reilly and Brown (2003) argued that there exist three 
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important assumptions that should hold for a capital market to be efficient. In their study, 
Reilly and Brown (2003) argued that for the EMH to hold:  
 
1. There should be a large number of profit-maximising participants who analyse and 
value securities independent of each other 
2. New information regarding securities appears in the market in a random fashion. In 
addition, the timing of one announcement is independent of others 
3. Profit-maximising investors adjust security prices rapidly in order to reflect the effect 
of new information. The market will sometimes over-adjust and at other times it will 
under-adjust, however the investor cannot predict which will occur at any given time 
(Reilly and Brown, 2003:177). 
 
The above assumptions give rise to the idea that the EMH is associated with the concept of a 
“random walk,” which assumes that security price changes are random and unpredictable. 
The logic of the random walk idea is that if the informational flow is unconstrained and stock 
prices immediately reflect new information, then tomorrow’s price change is independent of 
today’s price change. This is a consequence of intelligent investors competing to discover 
under- or over-priced stocks to buy or sell before the rest of the market becomes aware of 
aforementioned arbitrage opportunities (Bodie, Kane and Marcus, 2011:341). In the random 
walk model, the return process is illustrated by a cumulated series of independent shocks. 
The returns can be written as:  
  
    𝑅𝑡 = 𝜇 + 	𝜀(𝑡)	~	(0, 𝜎2),                          (3.1) 
 
where µ represents the expected return and e(t) is white noise, i.e. independent distribution 
with mean zero and variance s2 (Moix, 2001:60). 
 
The EMH began to gain popularity in the 1960s, becoming one of the most influential 
concepts of modern financial economics. Five decades after its inception, it remains the 
controlling theory of portfolio management (Sharma, 2014). Similar to other theories, the 
EMH theory had its share of criticism, especially from the behavioural theorists who argue 
that markets are inefficient and that investors do not behave rationally as assumed by the 
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EMH theory. In support of their argument, the behavioural theorists claim that a large number 
of investors display irrational behaviour. For example, Yavrumyan (2015) argues that uneven 
reactions by investors to new information lead to the problem of over- and under-reaction, 
which is inconsistent with the EMH theory.  
 
In response to the behavioural theorists’ criticism, the proponents of the EMH theory also 
noted some contradictions in the claim of the behavioural theorists. For example, Mahesh 
(2016) found that numerous conclusions drawn from behavioural finance on market 
efficiency contradict each other. After noting these contradictions, the proponents of the 
EMH theory argued that behavioural finance has been found to represent a large number of 
the anomalies that can be explained by the EMH.  
 
In addition, Malkiel (2003) opined that markets cannot be perfectly efficient, or else investors 
would have no incentive to try and beat the market, hence, making active management 
obsolete. Those who support the EMH theory argue that markets are exceedingly efficient 
regarding the utilisation of information and, thus, market prices provide the best estimates 
of value. They argued that if markets are not perfectly efficient, then market prices would 
deviate from their true values, hence making it difficult for the valuation process to provide 
an estimate of the true value (Vidali, 2013). However, there are three levels of market 
efficiency discussed in prior studies. The next section discusses each of these levels 
separately, while also taking note of the difference between them.  
 
3.3  Types of Market Efficiency 
 
According to the EMH definition, market prices should incorporate all available information. 
However, a distinction is made between three levels of efficiency, as each level relates to a 
set of information which is increasingly more inclusive than the preceding one. The basis of 
the definitions for each level is the phrase “all available information.” Irrespective of the 
common use of the phrase “all available information”, each type of market efficiency is 
distinguished by the tests conducted on trying to prove each of them. Furthermore, the 
majority of empirical studies only test the weak-form of EMH due to the rarity of semi-strong 
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and strong-form market efficiency. Before discussing the findings in past studies, it is 
important to provide a brief overview of each type of market efficiency.  
 
As the discussion progresses from an explanation of one level to the next, it is also important 
to note that each stronger form of the EMH incorporates all the information in the previous, 
weaker forms of the EMH. In other words, the assumptions of the weak form are incorporated 
in the semi-strong form, and the assumptions of the semi strong (which incorporates those 
of the weak form) are also incorporated into the assumptions of strong-form EMH. The next 
subsections provide a brief account of each of the three forms explained above, starting with 
the weak form, followed by the semi-strong form and finally by the strong-form EMH. 
  
3.3.1  Weak-Form Market Efficiency 
 
The weak form of market efficiency affirms that stock prices already reflect all relevant past 
information about the stock, fully and instantaneously, when analysing market data such as 
past prices, trading volume or short interest. Price movements today are not correlated to 
yesterday’s price movements, implying the absence of predictably significant price patterns. 
This is because the theory claims that if historical data conveyed signals about future 
performance, all investors would already have learned to exploit the signals. As a result, these 
signals lose significance as they become widely known because a sell signal, for example, 
would result in an immediate price decrease (Bodie, Kane and Marcus, 2011). Therefore, 
technical analysis – used to analyse historical price patterns – is ineffective in generating 
excess returns in the market (Stanculescu and Mitrica, 2012).  
 
Empirical studies followed two different approaches in order to test if a market is weak-form 
efficient. The most commonly used approach tests the random walk of stock prices using 
statistical tools. The argument in these studies is that, if tests show that stock prices follow a 
random walk, then technical analysis is deemed futile in generating excess returns because 
the market is considered to be weak-form efficient. Conversely, if the random walk 
hypothesis is rejected by the tests, the market is not considered to be weak-form efficient. 
The most popular methodologies used in this approach are the serial correlation coefficient 
test, the runs test, unit root tests and the multiple variance ratio tests (Saramat and Dima, 
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2011). Generally, most statistical tests for weak-form efficiency support the proposition that 
price changes are random and historical data is ineffective in forecasting price changes 
profitably. 
 
The second approach in testing the weak-form efficiency of the market is to establish whether 
excess returns could be generated using trading strategies based on historical data. The most 
renowned method for testing this approach is the filter technique introduced by Alexander 
(1961)’s study on price movements in speculative markets. His technique is a mechanical 
trading rule which tries to identify movements in stock prices in a more sophisticated manner. 
The filter techniques uses an x-percent factor as a filter. An x-percent filter is defined as 
follows: If the daily closing price of the security moves up by at least x-percent, buy and hold 
the security until the price moves down by at least x-percent from the subsequent high, 
whereby the security can be sold and held in a short position.  
 
However, Fama and Blume (1966) criticised this approach when they argued that prices 
always adjust to new information, and that repeating the abovementioned filter strategy 
cannot generate excess returns if the market is weak-form efficient. In addition, Fama and 
Blume (1966) argued that Alexander (1961)’s computations included biases that seriously 
overstated the profitability of filters, thus making this second approach less reliable in testing 
weak-form efficiency. The second level of EMH theory is the semi-strong form and this is 
explained in the ensuing subsection. 
 
3.3.2  Semi-Strong Form Market Efficiency 
 
The semi-strong form of market efficiency states that share prices adjust to new publicly 
available information instantaneously and in an unbiased manner (Saramat and Dima, 2011). 
Examples of publicly available information are past prices, annual reports, financial 
statements, reports by the financial press, fundamental data on the firm’s product line, 
quality of management and earnings forecast (Bodie, Kane and Marcus, 2011). The argument 
behind the semi strong of market efficiency is that, if all investors have access to such 
information, then no investor can earn excess returns from trading strategies based on any 
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publicly available information. In essence, fundamental analysis – which uses publicly 
available information to estimate the intrinsic value of assets – is useless in generating excess 
returns if the market is semi-strong efficient.  
 
As explained in earlier sections, the semi-strong hypothesis covers the weak-form hypothesis 
as all the historical data contained in the weak-form hypothesis is already considered by the 
semi-strong hypothesis. Thus, using fundamental analysis is equally as futile as using technical 
analysis in generating abnormal returns in a semi-strong efficient market (Fama, 1970). 
 
In testing the semi-strong form of the market efficiency, Reilly and Brown (2006) divided the 
tests into two methods. The first method involves predicting future rates of returns using 
publicly available information beyond historical data. The argument is that if these predictions 
are consistently profitable, then the market is not semi-strong form efficient. The second 
method uses event studies in order to determine how fast stock prices adjust to company-
specific or macroeconomic events. One example would be to test whether excess returns can 
be generated by investing in a security after a public announcement of a significant event, 
such as earnings. Thus, if excess returns are generated on a consistent basis under the event 
studies test, it can be concluded that the market is not semi-strong form efficient (Reilly and 
Brown, 2006). At the highest level is the strong form of the EMH and this is explained in the 
next subsection. 
 
3.3.3  Strong-Form Market Efficiency 
 
The strong form of market efficiency states that stock prices fully reflect all public and private 
information. This signifies that no investor has monopolistic access to private information 
relevant to the formation of prices which would allow them to outperform the market (Reilly 
and Brown, 2006). Therefore, no one can have an advantage in predicting securities’ prices 
since there is no data that would add any value to investors. As a result, no investor can 
generate excess return using any strategy, and any form of analysis is deemed useless in a 
market which is strong-form efficient (Bodie, Kane and Marcus, 2011). It is important to note 
that strong-form efficiency also encompasses weak-form and semi-strong form efficiency.  
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The testing for strong-form market efficiency is important as there are groups who have 
access to vital private information about a company, and who can potentially trade on it. 
These groups include top management, investment advisors and portfolio managers. Saramat 
and Dima (2011) argue that if these groups earn excess returns from their trading activities, 
then the market is not strong-form efficient. In fact, general literature on EMH concludes that 
there is yet to be a market which is strong-form efficient as this version of market efficiency 
is quite extreme.  
 
Barnes (2009) argues that markets are weak-form and semi-strong form efficient  but cannot 
be strong-form efficient due to the fact that insider trading is still rampant even though it is 
illegal and heavily monitored by financial regulators. The author further states that testing for 
strong-form market efficiency has been proven to be challenging due to the secrecy of insider 
traders and the timing of information (Barnes, 2009). In addition to testing whether the 
market is efficient in the weak form or semi strong form, other studies also investigated the 
determinants of an efficient market. A review of these determinants is discussed below 
 
3.4  Determinants of an Efficient Capital Market 
 
Fama (1970) stated that market efficiency depends on the speed and accuracy with which 
information is incorporated into prices. Fama (1970) further postulates that there exist three 
conditions for a capital market to be efficient. These conditions are: 
1. There are no transaction costs when trading stocks. 
2. All public and private information is costlessly available to all market participants.  
3. There should be an agreement on the implications of current information for the 
current stock price and distribution of future stock price.  
 
Despite postulating the conditions stated above, Fama (1970) acknowledged that those 
conditions do not apply to markets in practice due to the existence of transaction costs, the 
fact that information is costly and that some private information is withheld from the public. 
Consequently, Fama (1970) stated that: “Fortunately, the three conditions are sufficient for 
market efficiency, but not necessary.” There are a number of factors that determine how 
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efficient a market is. These determinants aim to satisfy Fama (1970)’s three conditions for an 
efficient capital market. For instance, there is debate in prior studies that the progression in 
informational and communication technology has led to the improvement in the efficiency of 
financial markets around the globe.  
 
Sabate et al. (2013), for example, found that the internet leads to an improvement in market 
efficiency by lowering costs in obtaining and disseminating information about stock prices. In 
addition, the internet is argued to facilitate the acquisition of information regarding 
investment opportunities, which in turn, improves the allocation of resources in a capital 
market (Sabate et al., 2013). Consistent with Sabate et al. (2013), Mlambo and Biekpe (2003) 
observed that the internet has enabled the reconciliation of bulky information required for 
technical and fundamental analysis of stocks into a ready-to-use arrangement. Hence, making 
it easier to observe deviations of the stock price from its intrinsic value. In this vein, the 
internet is argued to minimise the chance to earn excess returns through making the markets 
more efficient. 
 
Relating to the above point, Frino, McInish and Toner (1998), Hill (2000), Frino and Hill (2001) 
and Jiang et al. (2002) all found that increased consolidation of financial markets due to 
switching from open outcry systems to electronic trading systems leads to an improvement 
in market efficiency. Furthermore, Avolio, Gildor and Andrei (2002) argued that improving 
technologies has helped in reducing barriers to entry for providing financial services. They 
argued that the electronic trading system led to a minimisation in transaction costs due to 
increased competition, as well as increased processing power, which enables the extraction 
of more information in a shorter period of time (Avolio, Gildor and Andrei, 2002).  
 
Consistent with Avolio, Gildor and Andrei (2002) and Goldstein, Kumar and Graves (2014) also 
found that technical and fundamental analyses are becoming more computerised and the 
information is being processed faster as computers’ processing speed and power increase 
exponentially each year. This has especially been true since the introduction of high-
frequency trading and an increase in trade automation. The increase in trade automation 
enables the translation of technical and fundamental analysis into an immediate trade 
execution call, hence resulting in increased market efficiency.  
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Extant literature on EMH generally agrees that financial liberalisation leads to an 
improvement in market efficiency. Cho (1988), for instance, found that financial liberalisation 
in South Korea led to a decrease in transaction and borrowing costs, thus improving 
informational efficiency. Similarly, Galindo, Schiantarelli and Weiss (2003) observed twelve 
developing countries and concluded that financial liberalisation and a relaxation of capital 
controls led to an improvement in the efficiency with which markets allocate resources. 
However, Galindo, Schiantarelli and Weiss (2003) warned that liberalisation should be 
balanced with financial supervision as there is a positive correlation between official 
supervisory power and market efficiency. They argued that supervision is vital in deterring 
insider trading and that information is disseminated in the least costly manner for there to be 
an improvement in the efficiency of markets (Galindo, Schiantarelli and Weiss, 2003). 
 
In support of Galindo, Schiantarelli and Weiss (2003)’s argument of the importance of 
supervision, some studies empirically found that securities regulation is positively linked with 
improved market efficiency. For example, Gakeri (2011) argued that, for market efficiency to 
increase, the legal framework must facilitate the proper functioning of the stock market 
through ensuring that all relevant disclosure requirements are complied with and the 
necessary institutional framework for trading is put in place. In addition to the above, North 
and Buckley (2010) postulated that regulation can enhance the efficient operation of a market 
in two ways. Firstly, financial regulations can be designed in such a way that it promotes Fama 
(1970)’s conditions for an efficient capital market, as listed above. Secondly, regulation can 
help promote transparent disclosure to all parties that is clear, concise and effective. 
Furthermore, regulations can promote competition among companies and investors to help 
lower transaction costs and improve informational and allocative efficiency. 
 
Past studies claim that stock market liquidity and market efficiency are closely linked. Chordia, 
Richard and Subrahmanyam (2008), for example, analysed a sample of the top 193 traded 
companies in the NYSE and found that increased short-term liquidity is directly linked to 
improved market efficiency. The rationale being that a high degree of liquidity does not allow 
investors to absorb the impact of price pressures due to the imbalances between buy-sell 
orders and large order flows. Those who can detect price deviations from their fair value may 
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apply arbitrage which will, in turn, speed up the convergence of prices to their fair value. Thus, 
the result would be a low predictability of returns and a higher level of market efficiency.  
 
Furthermore, Chung and Hrazdil (2010) sampled 4,222 companies that traded on the NYSE 
and determined that there is a significant positive relationship between liquidity and market 
efficiency in both large and small, less-traded companies. Finally, Hodrea (2015) concluded 
that an increase in liquidity has a positive impact on information dissemination and efficiency, 
thus leading to improved market efficiency. Apart from the examination of the determinants 
of an efficient market, other studies examined market efficiency based on certain anomalies 
observed in the financial markets. A stream of these studies is reviewed in the following 
subsection. 
  
3.5  Market Anomalies and the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
 
Despite the theories and notion that markets are efficient, there are a number of market 
anomalies which have been observed in financial markets around the globe. There have been 
irrefutable cases of market inefficiency, even in markets which are considered to be efficient. 
Two good examples are the October 1987 market crash and the internet bubble of the late 
1990s. The fact that the crises occurred indicates that market participants did not act 
rationally and, as a result, the markets are deemed to be inefficient. These inefficiencies are 
argued to materialise through the different anomalies that will be discussed in this section. 
 
The anomalies discussed in this section appear more systematically in the market and can be 
attributed to calendar effects, behavioural biases of firms and economic agents, fundamental 
factors, structural factors and unpredictable random events. The next subsection reviews 
three groups of anomalies, that is, those related to calendar effects, behavioural biases and 






3.5.1  The Calendar Effect 
 
It has been observed that stock prices fluctuate in accordance with the financial calendar 
schedule, hence, the effect is dubbed the “Calendar Effect.” Past literature dictates that since 
prices oscillate depending on the day or month, or any major event, investors have an 
opportunity to benefit from these predicable stock price movements and generate excess 
returns. The most common types of calendar effects are the “January effect” and the 
“Weekend effect.” 
 
According to Rozeff and Kinney (1976), the January effect is a seasonal anomaly where 
markets exhibit higher-than-average returns in the month of January. Stock prices tend to 
increase between the 31st of December and the first week of January. Thus, investors buy low 
at year-end and sell high at the next year-start. Resultantly, the effect contradicts the EMH as 
investors can realise excess returns.  
 
Wachtel (1942) was the main proponent of the January effect. He based his theory on three 
assumptions: (1) High-yielding stocks are usually the stocks whose prices have decreased, 
thus they are the best stocks to sell in December to obtain tax benefits, (2) individuals and 
corporations sell stocks for tax-saving purposes in mid-December to establish tax losses, 
leading to a downward pressure in prices to below their fair value, (3) the rise at the year’s 
end is nothing more than a normal reaction from depressed levels. The first assumption 
implies that the January effect is primarily a small-firm phenomenon. In addition, Ligon (1997) 
found that the January effect exists due to the large amount of liquidity available during 
January. Higher trading volumes and lower interest rates in this month directly correlate with 
greater returns.  
 
Kumar and Jawa (2016) observed that mean returns on Mondays are the smallest, sometimes 
being negative, while mean returns on Fridays are the highest compared to other days of the 
week. This is known as the weekend effect. Fortune (1998) attributed the weekend effect to 
an “information release hypothesis,” whereby information released during the week tends to 
be positive while information released during the weekend tends to be more negative. This 
is because firms with good news want to get it to the public as soon as possible, while bad 
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news will be withheld for as long as possible and only released late on Friday to avoid investor 
scrutiny. Alternatively, Pompian (2012) found that the weekend effect can be credited to the 
fact that investors feel more positive on Friday, due to the coming weekend, than on 
Mondays. 
 
The next group of anomalies relates to the behaviour of market participants, that is, the 
investors. The argument has its origins from the behavioural theorists. The argument 
proffered by this group of theorists is reviewed in the next subsection. 
 
3.5.2  Behavioural Biases 
 
A large number of behavioural-finance supporters argue against the EMH on the basis that 
investors are not rational. To back this claim, they argue that investor irrationality stems from 
the fact that investors exhibit a large number of cognitive heuristics (Zindel, Zindel & Quirino, 
2014). The most common types of heuristics are: representativeness, adjustment and 
anchoring, herding, overconfidence and loss aversion.  
 
Gupta, Bedi and Lakra (2014) describe representativeness as the attempt by investors to 
judge the probability of uncertain events in accordance with how similar the current event is 
to a past event, and the degree to which it reflects the significant features of the process by 
which it is generated. By doing this, the investor neglects information about the unique 
features of the probability of the current event. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) state that 
representativeness can also lead to investors deducing patterns in random sequences of data, 
or assuming that future patterns resemble past ones. As a result, they argued that this often 
leads to investors making wrong conclusions about stock trends and patterns (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974).  
 
Furthermore, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) state that investors make estimates by starting 
from an initial value that is adjusted in order to produce the final answer. In essence, different 
starting points yield different estimates which are biased towards the initial values—this is 
called anchoring and adjustment. In most cases, the adjustments are insufficient which yields 
incorrect estimates. A good example in financial markets is that past prices are likely to act as 
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anchors for today’s prices if solid technical and fundamental information is missing (Montier, 
2002). 
 
Gupta, Bedi and Lakra (2014) describe herding as a phenomenon where investors feel the 
need to join in groups, hence, developing herd behaviour in decision-making situations. 
Banerjee (1992) adds that investors and fund managers will rather copy others’ decisions 
rather than using their own information. Consequently, they enter into risky ventures without 
conducting a suitable risk-reward analysis. Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001) argued that 
herding behaviour aggravates volatility, destabilises markets and intensifies the frailty of the 
financial system. 
 
Konstantinidis et al. (2016) define overconfidence as an investor’s tendency to overestimate 
his or her abilities or skills in the investment decision-making process. Thus, investors are 
argued to be too confident in their knowledge and analysis because of the information they 
possess. As a result of overconfidence, investors make incorrect investment decisions. 
Stammers (2011) argues that overconfidence stems from the fact that novice investors get 
lucky, as their initial stock-picking decisions usually generate large excess returns. At this 
point, they start believing in themselves too much, thinking that they have a magical touch 
and that they are smarter than all of the other investors. More often than not, subsequent 
stock picks perform disastrously due to lack of proper stock analysis and investor arrogance. 
 
Barberis and Huang (2001) state that investors suffer greater disutility from a loss than utility 
from an equal gain in their portfolio. Accordingly, behavioural finance considers investors to 
be loss-averse rather than risk-averse—hence giving rise to the loss aversion heuristic. 
Grinblatt and Han (2005) argue that loss aversion can help explain stock momentum effects. 
Past winners are excessively pressured to sell, and past losers are not shunned as rapidly as 
they should be under the EMH. This leads to investors underreacting to public information – 
past winners are undervalued, and past losers are overvalued. The result is a momentum 




The last group of anomalies is based on the use of fundamental analysis to establish the 
intrinsic value of stocks. Several anomalies were detected in prior studies, and these are 
discussed in the next subsection.  
 
3.5.3  Fundamental Anomalies 
 
This type of market inefficiency is based on the fundamental analysis of stocks, which is used 
to predict the intrinsic value of stocks based on analyses of economic, financial, qualitative 
and quantitative factors (Vidali, 2013). Fundamental anomalies often surface during analysis, 
giving investors opportunities to generate excess returns. The most common types of 
fundamental anomalies are: small firm effect, value stock effect and the impact of earnings 
announcements on stock prices. 
 
The small firm effect is a theory linking a company’s size to the return on its stock. Vidali 
(2013) found that smaller cap stocks tend to outperform larger cap stocks because smaller 
firms have a greater room for growth and a more volatile business environment. This 
translates into smaller cap companies having lower stock prices and higher price increases 
than large cap companies. Malkiel (2003) stresses that this anomaly represents a predictable 
pattern which enables investors to generate excess returns based on the higher price 
appreciations of smaller stocks. 
 
Prior literature provides convincing evidence that “value” stocks outperform “growth” stocks. 
These two types of stocks can be differentiated using the price-earnings multiple and price-
to-book ratio. Fama and French (1998) found that firms with a lower price-earnings multiple 
(value stocks) outperform growth stocks in twelve out of the thirteen major global markets. 
In addition, Malkiel (2003) concluded that stocks with a lower price-to-book ratio (value 
stocks) outperform those with a higher price-to-book ratio because investors overpay for 
“growth” stocks which end up failing to perform as highly as expected. Fama and French 
(1998) state that this fundamental anomaly is heavily ingrained into almost all major financial 




Elena-Dana and Ioana-Cristina (2013) found that the effects of earnings announcements on 
prices tend to persist even after the initial announcement, with the trend being exacerbated. 
As a result, positive earnings announcements are argued to generate an upward stock-price 
trend, while negative earnings announcements generate a downward stock-price trend 
(Elena-Dana & Ioana-Cristina, 2013). In addition, Elena-Dana and Ioana-Cristina (2013) argued 
that stocks with consistent growth continue growing above market expectations while stocks 
with a consistent fall in prices will fall even further, despite the fact that initial decreases were 
higher than expected. The argument led Elena-Dana and Ioana-Cristina (2013) to dub the 
effect of earnings announcements on prices as the “paradox of high-higher or low-lower.” 
 
Owing to the discussion above, the next section reviews empirical evidence on the efficiency 
of the BSE. The next section forms the basis on which this study was designed since it uses 
Botswana as its location of study. Suggestions in prior studies on the efficiency of the BSE 
provide valuable contributions that this study could possibly make to the existing literature. 
The review in the next section focuses on the efficiency of the BSE in general; thereafter, focus 
is also on studies that tested whether the BSE was efficient for period during the 2008 
financial crisis and after the automation of the BSE. This review is presented below.  
 
3.6  Empirical Evidence: The EMH and the Botswana Stock Exchange 
 
Turning of the studies conducted on the efficiency of the BSE, the bulk of literature testing 
weak-form efficiency in the BSE suggests that stock returns in the BSE are predictable, hence 
violating the concept of weak-form market efficiency. Appiah-Kusi and Menyah (2003), for 
example, concluded that stock returns in the BSE do not follow a random walk, thus indicating 
that the market is not weak-form efficient. An alternative study conducted by Mlambo and 
Biekpe (2007) similarly found that Botswana rejected the random walk hypothesis using the 
runs test, implying that the BSE is weak-form inefficient. 
 
Similarly, Chiwira and Muyambiri (2012) tested for weak-form market efficiency of the BSE 
for the period 2004-2008 using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, autocorrelation test, 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, Runs test and Phillips Perron unit root test. Every test investigated 
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weekly and monthly All-Share Index returns for the period 2004 to 2008. All of the tests came 
to a mutual conclusion that the BSE is inefficient in the weak-form. Thus, in their conclusion, 
Chiwira and Muyambiri (2012) suggested that a number of adjustments were required in 
order to improve the efficiency of the BSE. These suggestions included the implementation 
of more coordinated information dissemination so that information reflects on prices 
immediately, replacing the open outcry system with an Automated Trading System (ATS) and 
decreasing the settlement time from T-5 to T-3. 
 
Radikoko (2014) gives a more up-to-date revision of weak-form market efficiency in the BSE. 
However, the data used is still limited, as it only goes up to 2013. The study used the 
autocorrelations, ADF and runs test to test for weak-form efficiency in the BSE. Consistent 
with the aforementioned results, all of the tests conducted in the paper reject the random 
walk hypothesis, implying that the BSE is weak-form inefficient. Thus, prior findings show that 
it is possible for investors to use technical and fundamental analysis to generate excess 
returns on the BSE. Radikoko (2014) further states that it may still be too soon for the impact 
of the implementation of the CSD and ATS to be pronounced in the BSE, suggesting that future 
studies should be able to see a more noticeable effect of these on market efficiency. 
 
While acknowledging the contribution of findings in past studies on weak-form efficiency of 
the BSE the results from these studies are now outdated, as the data which they used for the 
tests predate the implementation of automation in the BSE. Henceforth, this study aims to 
test the weak-form market efficiency on the BSE using an updated set of data, with the 
objective of adding noteworthy value to the general EMH literature. In addition, this study 
considers the recommendations suggested by Chiwira and Muyambiri (2012) and Radikoko 
(2014). The notable factor is that the recommendations suggested by the abovementioned 
researchers have been implemented by the BSE, which makes it necessary to examine if these 
changes have actually made the BSE efficient at least in the weak form. The expectation is 
that the changes should have led to an improvement in the efficiency of the BSE at least in 
the weak form.  
 
However, in order to observe whether this change has actually made the BSE efficient, it 
would be necessary to break the entire period under study into segments. These segments 
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are: the before, during and after financial crisis and period after automation of the BSE. 
Literature based on the before financial crisis and automation has already been discussed in 
the preceding sections, hence, the next subsections discuss EMH for the period during the 
2008 financial crisis and after the automation of the stock exchange. This literature is 
discussed below. 
 
3.7  Empirical Evidence: The 2008 Financial Crisis and the EMH 
 
A review of past studies provides mixed conclusions regarding the effect of the 2008 financial 
crisis on market efficiency. A number of studies conclude that the crisis had a positive impact 
on market efficiency on various markets around the globe (Sengonul and Degirmen, 2011; 
Rizvi & Arshad, 2016; Arshad et al., 2016), others state that it had a negative impact 
(Anagnostidis, Varsakelis and Emmanouilides, 2016; Ali and Afzal, 2012; Lim et al., 2008) while 
a small number of studies conclude that the crisis had an insignificant effect on market 
efficiency (Sharma and Seth, 2011; Mahmood et al., 2010; Rizvi and Arshad, 2016).  
 
Surprisingly, some studies show that the 2008 financial crisis proved to be especially 
beneficial to developing countries’ market efficiency. For example, Sengonul and Degirmen 
(2011) used a GARCH (1,1) approach to test for market efficiency before and after the crisis 
on European Union countries and Turkey. In their study, Sengonul and Degirmen (2011) found 
that market efficiency improved post-crisis in Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Malta and Slovenia. 
Moreover, Turkey has been identified as the perfect definition of being in between a 
developing and developed country. Sengonul and Degirmen (2011) found that Turkey’s 
market efficiency improved after the crisis.  
 
Consistent with the results above, Rizvi and Arshad (2016) concluded that market efficiency 
showed significant improvement of East Asian markets’ efficiency in the wake of the global 
crisis. However, it is important to note that the improvement in market efficiency only 
occurred exclusively in developing countries. They attributed this to the countries’ officials’ 
rapid reaction to the crisis when they implemented financial liberalisation policies, 
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implementing policies which had an effect of stimulating savings and domestic investments 
and attracting foreign direct investment (Rizvi and Arshad, 2016). 
 
Similarly, Arshad et al. (2016) used the Christiano-Fitzgerald filter and the Multifactural de-
trended fluctuation analysis to test for the effect of the financial crisis on the top 20 countries, 
by market capitalisation, in the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC). They conclude that 
all 20 countries in the sample showed signs of improved efficiency after the crisis. In light of 
this, Arshad et al. (2016) concluded that improving efficiency is a positive omen for the 
development of the financial sector, as well as the growth of the economy, in these countries. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, Anagnostidis et al. (2016) found that the 2008 financial 
crisis had a significant negative impact on the stock market efficiency in most of the Eurozone 
capital markets. Moreover, the Eurozone stock price movements exhibited mean-reverting 
patterns after the crisis, indicating a drastic shifting away from market efficiency. 
Complementing the above results, Sengonul and Degirmen (2011) observed that EU and non-
EU Eastern European countries, such as the Czech Republic and Latvia, tended to depart from 
weak-form efficiency after the crisis. These countries suffered from a persistence in volatility, 
which was greater than 1. 
 
Stock markets in Asia have also been negatively affected by the 2008 financial crisis. Ali and 
Afzal (2012) concluded that the crisis had an adverse impact on stock returns and enhanced 
volatility of both the Indian and Pakistani stock exchanges, leading to a weakening of market 
efficiency in the two abovementioned markets. Lim, Brooks and Kim (2008) found that the 
crisis had adversely impacted the efficiency of most Asian markets significantly, with special 
emphasis on Hong Kong, Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and South Korea. The 
decrease in efficiency was attributed to nonlinear serial dependencies, which provided 
evidence of deviation from equilibrium in the markets. 
 
Between the two extremes, some studies presented in prior literature suggest that the 2008 
financial crisis had an insignificant effect on the efficiency of markets around the globe. 
Sharma and Seth (2011) analysed both the Bombay Stock Exchange and National Stock 
Exchange in India in order to determine the impact of the 2008 financial crisis on market 
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efficiency. They used the Jarque-Bera test, runs test, unit root test and autocorrelation 
function on data which spanned 10 years, between 2000 and 2010. Sharma and Seth (2011) 
found that there were no significant differences in both markets’ efficiencies when comparing 
the pre- and post-crisis period.  
 
Mahmood et al., (2010) used the ADF test, runs test, Lo and MacKinlay (1988) Variance Ratio 
test and the Durbin-Watson test to study the impact of the 2008 financial crisis on the Chinese 
stock market and found that the Chinese stock market is already weak-form efficient, and 
that the crisis had an insignificant impact on its efficiency.  
 
Based on the discussion above, it is worth noting that the majority of prior studies that tested 
the effect of the crisis on Asian markets’ efficiency concluded that the effect was either 
positive (Sengonul and Degirmen, 2011), negative (Anagnostidis et al., 2016) or insignificant 
(Mahmood et al., 2010; Sharma and Seth, 2011; Rizvi and Arshad, 2016). Rizvi and Arshad 
(2016) concluded that the crisis did not significantly affect Indonesia’s stock market efficiency 
because of its large population, increased savings and income from the local population.  
 
In addition to examining the impact of financial crisis on stock market efficiency, other studies 
examined whether the change in systems that facilitate the operations of the stock exchange 
have an impact on the efficiency of the stock exchange. These studies examined periods 
before and after the automation of an exchange’s operations to determine whether a switch 
from the open cry system to an automated system improves the efficiency of the stock 
exchange. The findings from these studies are discussed in the subsection that follows. 
 
3.8  Empirical Evidence: Stock Market Automation and the EMH 
 
Prior studies suggests that stock market automation has a significant positive effect on market 
efficiency. Dicle and Levendis (2013), for example, analysed the effect of the implementation 
of the SETS, the London Stock Exchange’s electronic order book, on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (JSE) in 2002. The authors found that trading activity doubled, and trading became 
cheaper after the implementation of the system. Moreover, after the introduction of the 
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SETS, the JSE became more independent and offered better diversification opportunities for 
domestic and international investors. As a result, the abovementioned effects were argued 
to have translated to significantly improved market efficiency on the JSE (Dicle and Levendis, 
2013). 
 
In Kenya, Stephen et al., (2013) studied the impact of the Nairobi Securities Exchange’s (NSE) 
full automation in 2006 on market efficiency. Just one year after the NSE was fully automated, 
Stephen et al. (2013)’s study found that market efficiency on the NSE had improved 
significantly. Based on their findings, Stephen et al., (2013) concluded that the automated 
exchange became deeper and more liquid than when the NSE had an open outcry system. 
Still in Kenya, a more recent study by Mwangi (2015) showed that the automation of the NSE 
resulted in the improvement of market capitalisation, stock turnover and the total value of 
stocks traded. In addition, the study showed that the cost of trading decreased, and that 
liquidity saw an upsurge, which clearly shows that there was an improvement in the NSE’s 
efficiency (Mwangi, 2015). 
 
In Singapore, Naidu and Rozeff (1994) analysed the full automation of the Singapore Stock 
Exchange (SSE) in 1989, and its impact on market efficiency. In their study, Naidu and Rozeff 
(1994) examined 28 stocks, before and after automation, and concluded that automation is 
associated with increases in volumes traded, return volatility and liquidity (Naidu & Rozeff, 
1994). In addition, their studies also observed improvements in price dissemination and a 
fairer matching of orders on the SSE. The aforementioned outcomes provided additional 
evidence of an improvement in market efficiency in the SSE. 
 
In Hong Kong, Jiang et al. (2002) examined the effects of the switch from an open outcry 
system to an electronic trading system on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange’s (HKSE) efficiency 
and found that automation led to an improvement in the pricing information collection and 
transmission to market participants, leading to better informational efficiency. As a result, 
they concluded that stock prices displayed information quicker and more effectively after 
automation (Jiang et al., 2002). In addition, Jiang et al. (2002) found that electronic trading 
led to a more transparent price discovery, reduced frauds and diminished human errors. The 
results after automation contrasted the findings when the HKSE had an open outcry system. 
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For the period before automation, that is, when the HKSE had an open outcry system, Jiang 
et al. (2002) found that there were different prices for the same stock, orders were not often 
fairly matched and there were human errors. Therefore, based on a comparison of the results 
for the period before and after automation, Jiang et al. (2002)’s study clearly showed that 
there was an improvement in the HKSE’s efficiency post-automation. 
 
However, there are a few studies that suggest that automation has had an insignificant effect 
on stock market efficiency. For example, Sioud and Hmaied (2003) analysed the impact of 
automation on liquidity, volatility and stock market efficiency on the Tunisian Stock Market. 
The authors concluded that, although liquidity had increased to some extent, the electronic 
trading mechanism did not reduce pricing error (Sioud and Hmaied, 2003). As a result, they 
concluded that the effect of automation on stock market efficiency was essentially 
insignificant (Sioud and Hmaied, 2003). 
 
In Ghana, Mensah et al. (2014) looked at the automation of the Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE) 
in 2008. The study investigated the impact of the automation on GSE’s efficiency using a unit 
root test and GARCH models. The results indicated that liquidity improved slightly and so did 
market capitalisation. However, the study showed that the GSE was not weak-form efficient, 
even after automation (Mensah et al., 2014). This suggests that automation of the GSE had 
an insignificant impact on market efficiency.  
 
3.9  Summary 
 
This chapter discussed the theory of the EMH, types of market efficiency, determinants of an 
efficient market and anomalies that lead to a market being inefficient. The discussion above 
revealed that the results in prior studies are mixed. The differences were mainly attributed to 
determinants of market efficiency and some of the anomalies that may lead to inefficiencies 




This current study, in addition to examining the period before, during and after the 2008 
financial crisis, uses a longer period after the automation of the BSE to allow for the market 
to adjust to changes and for the market players to understand the working of the new system. 
In order to facilitate the running of the tests for this study, the next chapter discusses the data 






























CHAPTER 4 - METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
The purpose of the study is to determine the effect of the 2008 financial crisis and stock 
market automation on stock market efficiency on the BSE. Thus, this chapter provides an 
explanation of the data used and a detailed account of methodologies commonly used in 
testing market efficiency; including what each test entails and methodological issues shown 
in past studies. This will be followed by a detailed explanation of the research approach that 
was followed. 
 
4.2  Data Population 
 
This study makes use of secondary financial data. The market efficiency of the BSE is analysed 
using the BSE All Share Index: an author-created index incorporating the BSE Domestic 
Company Index (DCI) and BSE Foreign Company Index (FCI). The BSE All Share Index is 
calculated using weighted averages of the value of stocks. In addition, the currency base is 
denominated in Botswanan Pula (BWP).  
 
It is worth noting that the index data used in this study is entirely weekly. This frequency was 
found to be ideal; daily data contains an excessive amount of market noise which might lead 
to inaccurate market efficiency test results, while monthly data during the study period 
renders too few observations to conduct reliable tests of market efficiency. The use of weekly 
prices is based on the recommendations made during the presentation of the proposal for 
this study. 
 
The data used for this study was collected from the INET and the Bloomberg terminals that 
are housed at the University of Cape Town’s main library. The platforms for data collection 
used for this study are reliable sources of data as the organisations that collect and collate 
the data are globally reputable. Overall, data analysed for this study was collected for period 
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ranging between 2005 and 2017; that is a total of 12 years. The split of the time series is 
indicated in table 4.1 below.  
 
TABLE 4.1: Description of the Time Series 
Test Data Data Period 
TESTING THE EFFECTS OF THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS ON MARKET EFFICIENCY 
Financial Crisis Effect on EMH (Before Crisis) BSE All Share Index (Weekly) Jan 2005 – Jan 2007 
Financial Crisis Effect on EMH (During Crisis) BSE All Share Index (Weekly) Jan 2007 – Jan 2009 
Financial Crisis Effect on EMH (After Crisis) BSE All Share Index (Weekly) Jan 2009 – Jan 2011 
TESTING THE EFFECTS OF STOCK MARKET AUTOMATION ON MARKET EFFICIENCY 
Automation Effect on EMH (Pre-Automation) BSE All Share Index (Weekly) Jan 2010 – Jul 2013 
Automation Effect on EMH (Post-Automation) BSE All Share Index (Weekly) Jul 2013 – Jan 2017 
 
Raw data was collected for the time period January 2005 – January 2011 testing the effect of 
the 2008 financial crisis on market efficiency. The data is equally split into three parts, 
respectively testing for market efficiency before (January 2005 – January 2007), during 
(January 2007 – January 2009) and after (January 2009 – January 2011) the crisis.  
 
Prevailing literature fixates the start of the financial crisis at August 2007 (Thakor, 2015). 
However, this study assumes that the financial crisis truly started materialising before then, 
in January 2007. Soros (2009) stated that trouble in the mortgage sector started to multiply 
early in 2007—On February 22, HSBC’s mortgage lending business declared losses of $10.8 
billion. On March 9, the biggest homebuilder in the US, DR Horton, warned of losses from 
subprime mortgages. On March 12, one of the biggest subprime loan lenders, New Century 
Financial, suspended trading of its shares due to being on the brink of bankruptcy. On April 2, 
New Century Financial filed for bankruptcy. On March 13, late mortgage payments and home 
foreclosures rose to an unprecedented high, and Accredited Home Lenders sold $2.7 billion 




In addition, data was collected for the time period January 2010 – January 2017 for testing 
the effect of stock market automation on market efficiency. The data is split in two distinct 
time series, respectively testing for market efficiency before (January 2010 – July 2013) and 
after (July 2013 – January 2017) stock market automation in the BSE.  
 
Although the implementation of the ATS was completed in October 2012, it only became fully 
operational in mid-2013. This was because the BSE faced challenges in the initial 
implementation and rollout of the ATS. In addition, listed companies were reluctant to switch 
to automated systems. However, all of the listed companies had switched and were actively 
trading in the ATS by mid-2013. Hence, the pre-automation period stretches until July 2013. 
  
The raw data was imported into Microsoft Excel, transformed into index returns and 
converted into natural logs of weekly prices of the index. The formula used for the conversion 
into natural logs is as follows: 
 
                                       ,                            (4.1) 
 
where rt was the return on the BSE All Share Index on week t; Pt was the closing value of the 
index on week t; and Pt-1 was the closing value of the index on week t-1. The price returns 
calculated using equation 4.1 are expressed as percentages. The data was transferred to the 
STATA 13 and E-Views 10 software for analysis of descriptive statistics. In addition, E-Views 
was used for running the serial correlations test, unit root tests and variance ratio test. The 
runs test was conducted using the SPSS 25 software utilising the same dataset. 
 
4.3  Method and Model Specification 
 
Four techniques were used to determine the effects of the 2008 financial crisis and stock 
market automation on BSE’s market efficiency. They are as follows: 
1. Runs test  
2. Unit root test 
3. Serial correlations test  
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4. Variance ratio test 
 
• DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
In addition to the abovementioned market-efficiency tests, a summary of the following 
descriptive statistics was calculated for each of the five-time series: mean, median, standard 
deviation, maximum, minimum, skewness, kurtosis and Jarque-Bera test statistic. 
 
Skewness is a measure of the asymmetry of a distribution. If the skewness measure is zero, 
the distribution is perfectly symmetrical and normally distributed. If skewness is greater than 
zero, then the distribution is skewed to the right and has a rightwards tail. If skewness is less 
than zero, then the distribution is skewed to the left and has a leftwards tail (Lovric, 2010). 
 
Kurtosis describes the peakedness or flatness of a distribution compared to a normal 
distribution. A kurtosis of 3 indicates that the stock returns are normally distributed. If the 
value of kurtosis is greater than three, the distribution is relatively peaked and is 
characterised as leptokurtic. If the value of kurtosis is lower than three, the distribution is 
relatively flat and is characterised as platokurtic (Čisar & Čisar, 2010).  
 
The Jarque-Bera test statistic is used to test for the normal distribution of the series. The 
results obtained are compared to and reinforced by the kurtosis and skewness tests. The 
Jarque-Bera statistic tests the null hypothesis: “the distribution is normal” and is calculated 
using the following formula (Abedini, 2009): 
 
 
               (4.2) 
 
where n denotes the number of observations. From here, we can calculate Skewness, 
measured by S and defined as the following:  
 




Furthermore, K is a measure of Kurtosis and is defined as the following:  
 
                                   (4.4) 
 
The critical value for the Jarque-Bera test at the 5% significance level is 5.99 (Abedini, 2009). 
Hence, if Jarque-Bera > 5.99 or if the p-value < 0.05, then the null hypothesis of normality is 
rejected. 
 
• RUNS TEST 
 
Vitali and Mollah (2010) describe the runs test as a non-parametric test that examines if 
successive price movements are independent of each other. This is done by comparing the 
number of runs observed in the series with the expected number if the series followed a 
random pattern. The test hypothesis is that if the returns in the series are random, then the 
observations are considered to be independent and the actual number of runs should be 
equal to, or at least close to, the expected number of runs. In addition, the test assumes that 
prices fluctuate randomly and independently (Fama, 1965).  
 
The runs test is a fitting statistical method for testing weak-form market efficiency because 
the validity of the test is not dependant on the shape of the distribution of returns (Abedini, 
2009). This is because it is a non-parametric test, hence returns do not need to be normally 
distributed. Finally, the Runs test pairs fittingly with the Serial Correlations tests as it is not 
affected by single outliers, while the latter is. 
 
A run is counted every time there is a sign change in the price series, with three possible 
changes – positive (+), negative (-) and zero (0). Elbarghouthi, Qasim and Yassin (2012) state 
that a plus run of length i is a sequence of i consecutive positive, negative or zero. For 
example, the sequence of daily prices of (109.05, 109.38, 108.78, 108.20, 107.57, 107.01, 
106.97, 107.04, 107.87, 107.87, 107.27, 106.78, 107.48, 107.53) has 6 runs (+, -, +, 0, -, +) with 




Fama (1965) described the runs test as examining whether the direction of one price series 
influences the direction taken in later observations, making it a relatively suitable test of 
market efficiency. The Runs test was conducted using the SPSS software  
 
The null and alternate hypotheses for the runs tests are as follows: 
 
 H0: R = E(r) (Successive changes in the index prices are random) 
 H1: R ¹ E(r) (Successive changes in the index prices are not random) 
 
The hypothesis is tested using a comparison between the observed number of runs and the 
expected number of runs, using the following formula: 
 
                                (4.5) 
 
where m is the expected number of runs; N is the total number price changes; and ni is the 
number of price changes of each sign. 
 
In addition, the standard error of the price series of runs is expressed using the following 
formula (Fama, 1965):  
 
           (4.6) 
 
 
The significance of the runs test is determined through calculating the difference between 
the actual number of runs, R, and expected number of runs, m. This difference is expressed 
by the means of a standardised variable. This is represented using the following formula: 
 
                              (4.7) 
 
The null hypothesis of independence is rejected if the z-value is greater than the critical value, 
implying that returns are not independent of each other. In addition, the sample cannot be 
independent if it contains too many or too few runs. A positive z-value is obtained if the actual 
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runs are greater than the expected runs, while a negative z-value is attained if the actual 
returns are less than expected returns.  
 
A significant difference between actual and expected returns is indicative that returns are not 
random, giving rise to the opportunity of investors earning excess returns. A scenario where 
the actual number of runs is significantly less than the expected values means that market 
participants overreacted to information, while a higher actual number of runs indicates a 
lagged response to information. 
 
If the Z-value is greater than the absolute value of 2.576, the null hypothesis is rejected at the 
1% significance level (Elbarghouthi, Qasim and Yassin, 2012), indicating a violation of the EMH 
– returns are not independent of each other and the market is not weak-form efficient. 
 
• UNIT ROOT TEST 
 
The EMH states that price movements need to be random (non-stationary), which is 
characterised by the presence of a unit root. In light of this, the unit root test examines 
whether the stock price time series are stationary or non-stationary. However, it is important 
to note that Gilmore and McManus (2003) state that a unit root is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for a random walk in a price series. They go on to state that the presence 
of a unit root itself is not sufficient to imply weak-form market efficiency; the returns must 
also be serially uncorrelated. Hence, the unit root test should ideally be paired with a serial 
correlations test in order to give a more accurate representation of market efficiency. 
 
The null and alternate hypotheses for the unit root test are as follows: 
 
H0: A unit root is present in the time series.           (b = 0) 
       H1: A unit root is not present in the time series.    (|b| >0) 
 
The null hypothesis above is tested using an Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. This builds 
up from the standard Dickey-Fuller test by accounting for higher order auto-regression 
through a parametric correction of adding l-lagged difference terms of the dependent 
 
 42 
variable to the right-hand side of the equation (Setyawan, 2010). The equation for the ADF is 
as follows: 
 
                                   (4.8) 
 
where yt is the time series to be tested for the unit root, ∆ is the difference operator, t is the 
time trend and µt is the white-noise term error – the aforementioned parametric correction. 
The ADF test statistic is the ratio of the estimated b value to its standard error obtained from 
the OLS regression (Buguk and Brorsen, 2003).  
 
The Phillips-Perron (PP) test is another unit root test which, in this study, is used as a control 
test in order to ensure that the ADF results are accurate in representing the level of 
stationarity of the time series. The PP test similarly checks whether a time series is stationary 
or non-stationary. In addition, it tests for the same null and alternate hypothesis as the ADF, 
making it an ideal control for unit root tests (Imam, Habiba and Atanda, 2016). 
 
The null hypothesis, for both the ADF and PP test, is rejected at the 1% significance level if the 
observed absolute quasi t-statistic is greater than the absolute critical value of 2.576. This 
would indicate that a unit root is not present in the time series, signifying that there is no 
evidence of randomness and that future price movements can be predicted using past price 
patterns. In this scenario, investors will be able to generate excess returns, indicating that the 
market is not weak-form efficient. 
 
• SERIAL CORRELATIONS TEST 
 
Vitali and Mollah (2010) describe the serial correlations test as a parametric test used to 
examine the absence of auto-correlation between a time-series variable and its lagged values. 
In essence, the test evaluates the independence of variables with their lagged values. 
 
This test is considered to be ideal to test for weak-form market efficiency because the 
relationship between price series in the current period with values in the previous periods is 
measured using auto-correlation (Abedini, 2009). In addition, the serial correlations test 
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complements the unit root test. As aforementioned, the presence of a unit root is not a 
sufficient condition to imply market efficiency: the price changes need to be serially 
uncorrelated as well. 
 
If the serial correlations test presents evidence of auto-correlation in the series, then the 
returns are not independent, showing that they do not follow a random walk. The 
consequence being that markets are inefficient, and it would be possible to make predictions 
about price future movements based on past price movements and use such information to 
generate excess returns (Kumar and Kumar, 2015). 
 
The null and alternate hypothesis for serial correlation tests are as follows:  
 
H0: Pk = 0 (There is an absence of serial correlation between price changes over 
successive q time lags – price changes are independent) 
H1: Pk ¹ 0 (There is positive or negative serial correlation between price changes over       
successive time lags – price changes are not independent) 
 
The Ljung and Box (1978) Q-statistic is used to test for serial correlation in the data series. It 
follows the approach of using a first-difference correlogram test in the EViews software to 
extrapolate the Q-statistic. In addition, the test was conducted on level data with 36 lags.  
 
The Ljung and Box (1978) test provides an ideal measure of serial correlation in a dataset of 
stock returns as it tests overall randomness based on a number of lags rather than testing 
randomness at each specific lag, which is usually observed in the Durbin-Watson test. In 
addition, the Ljung and Box (1978) is an improved and refined version of the original general-
purpose tests as it is more suitable for smaller sample sizes, where the datasets are usually 
not normally distributed (Wheeler et al., 2002). 
 
The Ljung and Box (1978) Q-statistic follows a chi-square distribution with k-degrees of 
freedom and is represented by the following equation: 
 
                           (4.9) 
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where N = number of observations, rj = the jth auto-correlation and k = number of auto-
correlations.  
 
A high Q-statistic, regardless of its sign, indicates the presence of correlation between the 
current stock price and the previous stock price—which provides evidence that the market is 
not weak-form efficient. Conclusively, if the absolute Q-statistic value is greater than or equal 
to the critical value at the chi-squared 1% critical level, the null hypothesis is rejected, and it 
can be concluded that there is significant statistical evidence of autocorrelation, signifying 
that the market is not efficient at the weak-form. 
 
• VARIANCE RATIO TEST 
 
Lo and MacKinlay (1988) mention that variance ratio tests are more powerful and accurate 
than alternative tests, such as the runs test and unit root tests, for examining the random 
walk hypothesis. In addition, Cochrane (1988) affirmed that variance ratio statistics are useful 
in computing the persistence of real output. Furthermore, Christiano and Eichenbaum (1990) 
showed that slight changes in parametric assumptions yield dramatically different 
conclusions about persistence and randomness in the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Ljung-
Box tests for market efficiency, while the variance ratio tests do not. 
 
Complementing the above, Füss (2005) stated that the traditional random walk tests, such as 
runs and serial correlation tests, are highly susceptible to errors caused by non-synchronous 
and low volume trading; a major characteristic in developing markets. In retrospect, the 
variance ratio statistics are immune to this problem as they rely on short-horizon 
autocorrelations to infer long-run events. These are useful in investigating stock returns that 
do not usually follow a normal distribution. 
 
Lo and MacKinlay (1988) developed a martingale difference hypothesis, tested using the 
variance ratio test in order to examine the existence of random walks in stock price time series 
under the assumptions of homoscedasticity and heteroscedasticity of the random error term. 




The null and alternate hypothesis for the variance ratio test are (Patel, Radadia and Dhawan, 
2012): 
 
 H0: VR(q) = 1 (The BSE is weak-form efficient) 
 H1: VR(q) ¹ 1 (The BSE is not weak-form efficient) 
 
The null hypothesis postulates that returns are not serially correlated, and the market is weak-
form efficient. However, if the null hypothesis fails to hold, then the returns are positively or 
negatively serially correlated. This leads to a rejection of the random walk hypothesis and the 
conclusion that the market is not weak-form efficient, as investors have the opportunity of 
generating excess returns (Patel, Radadia and Dhawan, 2012).  
 
Lo and MacKinlay (1988) and Charles and Darné (2009) state that if a price series follows a 
random walk with uncorrelated increments in pt, the variance of its q-differences would be q 
times the variance of its first differences as follows: 
 
                                (4.10) 
 
where q is a positive integer; pt and pt-q are the natural logarithm of prices at t and t-q 
respectively. Var(…) are the variances. Hence, the variance ratio, VR(q) is defined as: 
 
                                            (4.11) 
 
where s2(q) is 1/q times the variance of (pt – pt-q). and s2(1) is the variance of (pt – pt-1). The 
equations used to calculate s2(q) and s2(1) are as follows:  
 
 














                    (4.15) 
 
 
Two test statistics, Z(q) and Z*(q), are estimated by Lo and MacKinlay (1988) using an 
asymptotic distribution of the estimated variance ratio above. The two test statistics are 
estimated under the null hypothesis of homoscedastic and heteroscedastic increments of the 
random walk, respectively. This is described as follows: 
 
                      (4.16) 
 
                    (4.17) 
  
            
where:  
 
                                 (4.18) 
 
 
                    (4.19) 
 
where d(j) is the term describing heteroscedasticity in the model – a consistent estimator. It 
is calculated using the following formula:  
 




When the null hypothesis holds, Z(q) and Z*(q) have an asymptomatic standard distribution 
with mean zero and a standard deviation of 1. In addition, the nature of the variance ratio 
tests suggests that there exists different critical values for each individual test. Hence, the p-
value is used to determine the significance of the tests—a p-value less than 0.01 would 
constitute a rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% confidence interval (Chen, 2008; N’Dri, 
2015). If the null hypothesis is rejected, it is conclusive that returns are serially correlated, 
and the market is not weak-form efficient. If the p-value is greater than 0.01, the null 
hypothesis is not rejected, and it confirms that the market is at least weak-form efficient. 
 
In addition to Lo and MacKinlay (1988)’s original data tests, the bootstrap signs tests are used 
as a complement and consistency measure to the original data tests in order to reinforce the 
results of the latter. The bootstraps signs test aid in guarding against small sample bias – 
which suits this study, as it is divided into segments made up of a few years – hence if the 
change and magnitude of the results of the two tests over relevant time periods are similar, 
it strengthens the results and conclusion of the variance-ratio tests. 
 
The null and alternate hypothesis tested by both the bootstrap signs tests are the same as 
the original data tests: 
 
 H0: VR(q) = 1 (The BSE is weak-form efficient) 
 H1: VR(q) ¹ 1 (The BSE is not weak-form efficient) 
 
The results are considered to be statistically significant at the 1% if the p-value exceeds 0.01. 
Therefore, if the p-values of the tests exceed 0.01, the BSE ALSI returns would be considered 
to follow a random walk and an index containing a martingale. Thus, the conclusion in that 
case, would be that the null hypothesis is not rejected and that the BSE is weak-form efficient. 
 
4.4  Summary 
 
This chapter began by describing the data used in the study. A discussion was held on tests of 
market efficiency, and selected estimation models, and thereafter the research approach 
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followed for this study was explained. The next chapter discusses the results obtained from 
the runs test, serial correlations test, unit root test and variance ratio tests. Since the entire 



































CHAPTER 5 – ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the findings of the study. Since the study uses a multitude of methods 
to test the market efficiency of the BSE over a period that is also segmented into defined time 
frames, the analysis of results follows the same procedure so that each test and the 
associated segments are discussed separately from the other tests and their associated 
segments.  
 
To ensure coherence in the discussion of results, section 5.2 provides a discussion on the 
descriptive statistics, while section 5.3 presents an analysis of results based on the Runs Test. 
Section 5.4 presents an analysis of results based on the Unit Root Test. Section 5.5 provides 
an analysis of results based on the Serial Correlations Test while section 5.6 presents the 
analysis of results based on the Variance Ratio Test. Thereafter, section 5.7 presents overall 
discussion of results and the conclusion of the study. The aforementioned procedure for 
analysis is presented in the subsequent sections.   
 
5.2  Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 5.1 presents the descriptive statistics for all five time series: the first three time series 
test the effect of the financial crisis on market efficiency on the BSE; the last two time series 
test the effect of automation on market efficiency on the BSE. 
 
The results in Table 5.1 show that, for the pre-, during and post-financial crisis period, the BSE 
ALSI had the highest mean (0.7896%) for the pre-crisis period (2005-2007). This result is 
expected because Botswana’s economy and the BSE ALSI were at their peak performance 
prior to the financial crisis. However, since the crisis, Botswana’s economy and the BSE ALSI 
have not been able to return to the pre-crisis levels of economic performance. This is 
evidenced by the fact that the BSE ALSI had the lowest mean (-0.0225%) for the post-crisis 
 
 50 
period (2009-2011). Similarly, the BSE ALSI had the highest median (0.7896%) for the pre-
crisis period (2005-2007) and the lowest median (0.0003%) for the post-crisis period (2009-
2011). This result also confirms the better performance of the economy prior to the financial 
crisis relative to the crisis and post-crisis periods. 
 
Still on the pre-, during and post-financial crisis, for the period between 2005 – 2007 (pre-
crisis), the BSE ALSI recorded a maximum value of 7.7218% in the pre-crisis period while a 
minimum value of -1.6756% was achieved for the same period. For the period between 2007-
2009 (financial crisis period) the maximum value was 3.8134% while the minimum was -
4.3354%.  For the period between 2009-2011 (post crisis), the maximum value was 3.5928% 
while the minimum was -5.4006%. This analysis also confirms that Botswana’s financial 
market had not fully recovered from the 2007-2009 recession leading up to 2011.  
 
However, for the pre-automation period (2010-2013) the BSE ALSI achieved a maximum of 
2.5653% and a minimum of -5.4006%, while the post-automation period (2013-2017) had a 
maximum of 2.9293% and a minimum of -1.9116%. Overall, the results show that the pre-
crisis period (2005-2007) had the highest maximum value while the pre-automation period 
(2010-2013) had the lowest maximum value. As for the minimum values, the pre-crisis period 
(2005-2007) had the lowest minimum followed by the post-automation period (2013-2017). 
However, the results show that the maximum value has been improving since the pre-
automation period (2010-2013) although the maximum value is still below the pre-crisis 
period (2005-2007). A glance at both the minimum and maximum values, show that, overall, 
the BSE was on a recovery path since the pre-automation period (2010-2013). 
 
In addition to the recovery of the BSE performance, the post-automation period (2013-2017) 
recorded the lowest volatility as it had the lowest standard deviation. The results in Table 4.1 
show that financial crisis period (2007-2009) had the highest standard deviation of 1.5329% 
while the post-automation period (2013-2017) had the lowest standard deviation of 0.5700%. 
 
The previous chapter defined that a normal distribution has a skewness of zero: a right-tailed 
distribution has positive skewness and a left-tailed distribution has negative skewness. The 
skewness of the BSE ALSI is positive for the pre-crisis (2005-2007) and pre-automation periods 
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(2010-2013), indicating that these distributions have a right tail. The rest of the time series 
have negative skewness, indicating that the distributions have a left tail. The pre-crisis period 
(2005-2007) has the highest skewness at 2.2073, while the pre-automation period (2010-
2013) has the lowest skewness at-1.5409. 
 
All of the concerned time series have a kurtosis greater than 3, the highest being the pre-
automation period (2010-2013) with 14.4875 and the lowest being the financial crisis period 
(2007-2009) with 3.8558. This suggests that the density functions have a higher and sharper 
peak than a normal distribution and are known to be leptokurtic. It is worth noting that the 
financial crisis period (2007-2009) is the closest representative to a normally distributed 
density function, having skewness close to zero and kurtosis close to 3. 
 
The Jarque-Bera statistic tests for normal distribution were also conducted to validate the 
skewness and kurtosis tests of tails and peakedness of the distribution. It is worth restating 
that the 5% critical value for the Jarque-Bera test is 5.99. Therefore, the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected if the Jarque-Bera statistic is 5.99 and below. Table 5.1 shows that the 
financial crisis period (2007-2009) has a Jarque-Bera statistic less than 5.99. This means that 
the null hypothesis is not rejected, leading to a conclusion that the time series is normally 
distributed. The result is further confirmed by the fact that the time series in question has a 
skewness level close to zero and kurtosis of around 3. 
 
The remaining four time series – the before- and after-crisis, and the pre- and post-
automation series – have Jarque-Bera test statistics which are significantly greater than 5.99, 
with the highest being the pre-automation period (2010-2013), containing a test statistic of 
1079.6380. This signifies that the null hypothesis of a normal distribution is rejected, and it 
can be concluded that the time series before- and after-crisis and the pre- and post-
automation are not normally distributed. The outcome is confirmed by the results of the 
skewness and kurtosis tests which conclude that the distributions of the aforementioned four 
time series have a significant right or left tail and are leptokurtic. 
 
For a detailed account on the descriptive statistics and the data series’ distributions, refer to 
Figures 7.1 to 7.5 in the appendix.  
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TABLE 5.1: Summary of the Descriptive Statistics for the five time series. 







BSE ALSI  
2005 - 2007  
(Pre-Crisis) 
103 0.7896% 0.4673% -1.6756% 7.7218% 1.2599% 2.2073 11.5265 
395.6472 
(<0.0001) 
BSE ALSI  
2007 - 2009  
(Crisis) 
104 0.0363% 0.0054% -4.3354% 3.8134% 1.5329% -0.2975 3.8558 
4.7079 
(0.0949) 
BSE ALSI  
2009 - 2011  
(Post-Crisis) 
105 -0.0225% 0.0003% -5.4006% 3.5928% 1.1431% -0.7290 7.4426 
95.6488 
(<0.0001) 
BSE ALSI  
2010 - 2013  
(Pre-Automation) 
183 0.0945% 0.0831% -5.4006% 2.5653% 0.8203% -1.5409 14.4875 
1078.6380 
(<0.0001) 
BSE ALSI  
2013 - 2017  
(Post-
Automation) 




5.3  Runs Test 
 
The first test of the weak-form market efficiency was conducted using the runs test. The runs 
tests were conducted using the SPSS 25 software. The median was selected as an ideal cut-
point measure since the distributions are predominantly non-symmetrical and the data points 
are continuous. In addition, the runs test is appropriate for testing randomness in these data 
sets as the distributions are predominantly non-normal and the test is non-parametric. Five 
individual runs tests were conducted: the first three testing the weak-form efficiency of the 
BSE before, during and post the 2008 financial crisis, and the last two testing the weak-form 
efficiency of BSE pre and post the automation of the BSE. 
 
The null and alternate hypotheses for the runs tests are as follows: 
 
 H0: R = E(r) (Successive changes in the index prices are random) 
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 H1: R ¹ E(r) (Successive changes in the index prices are not random) 
 
If the Z-value is greater than or equal to the absolute value of 2.576, the null hypothesis is 
rejected at the 1% significance level. Such a result would indicate that the returns are not 
independent of each other and the BSE is not weak-form efficient. 
 
Table 5.2 below illustrates the evolution of weak-form efficiency of the BSE between 2005 
and 2007. The Z statistic for the runs test before the crisis is -2.2430, which is lower than the 
critical value of -2.576. Thus, the runs test show that the BSE was weak-form efficient prior to 
the crisis. Nevertheless, market efficiency broke down during the financial crisis. The Z 
statistic for the financial crisis period (2007-2009) is -7.2920. The Z statistic is greater than the 
critical value, meaning that the BSE was not weak-form efficient during the crisis.  
 
In addition, the runs test show that the BSE did not manage to regain its pre-crisis efficiency 
even after the crisis. The Z statistic for the post-crisis period (2009-2011) is -5.0010. This 
means that the prices changes on the BSE ALSI were still not random. Hence, the BSE was not 
weak-form efficient even after the crisis. However, a distinction between the during and the 
post-crisis periods is that the Z statistic for the post-crisis period is lower than that of the 
financial crisis period. This shows that the weak-form efficiency of the BSE improved slightly 
after the crisis – evidenced by a decline in the Z value from -7.292 for the crisis period to -
5.0010 for post crisis period.  
 
TABLE 5.2: Results of Runs Tests between 2005 and 2011 
Data Series 
Number of Runs 
(R) 
Total Cases (m) Z statistic p-value 
BSE ALSI  
2005 - 2007 (Pre-Crisis) 
38 103 -2.2430 0.0250 
BSE ALSI  
2007 - 2009 (Crisis) 
16 104 -7.2920 0.0000 
BSE ALSI  
2009 - 2011 (Post-Crisis) 




Further tests based on the runs test were also conducted to examine if the changes made to 
the BSE through automation have had an impact on its efficiency. The runs test results for the 
pre- and post-automation periods are shown in Table 5.3 below. Table 5.3 show that the Z 
statistic was -3.7800 for the pre-automation period (2010-2013) and -4.6700 for the post-
automation period (2013-2017). These statistics show that the BSE was not weak-form 
efficient over the pre- and post-automation periods. What is surprising to note is that the Z 
statistic for the post-automation period is even greater than the pre-automation period. This 
finding is contrary to the expectation because it shows that the BSE became less efficient after 
automation despite the numerous advantages that automation is perceived to bring to 
improving the efficiency of the market.  
 
TABLE 5.3: Results of Runs Tests between 2010 and 2017 
Data Series Number of Runs (R) Total Cases (m) Z statistic p-value 
BSE ALSI  
2010 - 2013 (Pre-Automation) 
67 183 -3.7800 0.0000 
BSE ALSI  
2013 - 2017 (Post-Automation) 
61 183 -4.6700 0.0000 
 
Refer to Tables 7.1 to 7.5 in the appendix for more detailed results on the runs tests. 
 
However, given that the runs test results in a type 1 error rate if it is used to investigate the 
independence of errors in time-series regression models and that it is not robust to slight 
differences between data sets which might arise due to rounding errors, other methods were 
also conducted to validate the findings. The next test that was conducted to validate the runs 
tests was the Unit Root test. The results from Unit Root test are discussed below. 
 
5.4  Unit Root Test 
 
The unit root test checks for the presence of a unit root in the time series, with its presence 
indicating that the time series is non-stationary. A non-stationary time series implies that the 
index follows a random walk and that the market is weak-form efficient. In contrast, the 
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absence of a unit root is evidence of serial correlation in the data series, which would signify 
that the market is not weak-form efficient.  
 
Two unit root tests were selected for this study: the main one being the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) Test and the control being the Philipps-Perron (PP) Test. In addition, the tests 
were conducted using the SPSS 25 software. These tests are especially suitable for testing for 
the presence of a unit root using the data series utilised in this study due to their 
predominantly non-normal nature. 
 
As shown in the methodology section, the null and alternate hypotheses for the unit root 
tests are as follows: 
 
H0: A unit root is present in the time series.            (The time series is non-stationary) 
       H1: A unit root is not present in the time series.     (The time series is stationary) 
 
The null hypothesis cannot be rejected if the computed p-value is greater than the 
significance level alpha (herein, 1%, 5% or 10%). The results in Table 5.4 show that the ADF 
unit root tests for pre-, during- and post-financial crisis period are all significant at 1%. This 
means that the computed p-values are not greater than the significance level, thus the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected for all the three series. Since the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected, it can be concluded that the BSE was not weak-form efficient before, during or after 
the financial crisis period. However, a closer look at the 1st differences values for the ADF test 
shows that the 1st difference value for the pre-crisis period was the highest while that of the 
post-crisis period was the lowest. This finding shows that, even though the BSE was not weak-
form efficient, there are signs that there was an improvement during the crisis which is also 
shown through after the crisis period. For example, the ADF 1st difference value changed from 
4.489312 before crisis to 3.663734 during crisis and then to 3.062434 post-crisis. The 
improvement of market efficiency over a crisis period is surprising since crises are assumed 
to distort the operations of the markets.  
 
Similarly, the PP test, which is used as a control test, also confirms that the BSE was not weak-
form efficient for all the series discussed above. Therefore, consistent with the ADF, the PP 
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test further confirms that the BSE’s efficiency improved slightly during and post-crisis when 
compared to the pre-crisis period. This is supported by the change in the PP’s 1st difference 
test statistic from -14.69624 to -14.20310. 
 
TABLE 5.4: Results of Unit Root Tests between 2005 and 2009 
Data Series 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Test Philipps-Perron (PP) Test 
Level 1st Difference Level 1st Difference 
BSE ALSI  
2005 - 2007 
(Pre-Crisis) 
-12.66104*** 4.489312*** -17.61090*** -14.69624*** 
BSE ALSI  
2007 - 2009 
(Crisis) 
-9.225601*** 3.663734*** -14.31918*** -14.07386*** 
BSE ALSI  
2009 - 2011 
(Post-Crisis) 
-10.79009*** 3.062434*** -14.54665*** -14.20310*** 
Notes: significant at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***), respectively. 
 
Similar tests were also conducted for the pre- and post-automation periods. These results are 
shown in Table 5.5. A glance at the results show that both test statistics for the ADF unit root 
tests are significant at 1% level.  Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected, leading to the 
conclusion that the BSE was not weak-form efficient pre- and post-automation periods.  
 
The finding is also confirmed by the PP unit root tests, as can be seen in Table 5.5. Evidence 
shows that the 1st difference ADF test statistic decreased from 3.783901 to 3.629652. In 
addition, the PP 1st difference test statistic also decreased from -18.16145 to -17.49226. 
Therefore, these results show that the 1st difference values for both the ADF and PP tests 
improved post the automation period.  
 
Interestingly, the pre-automation period had a 1st difference value greater than the during-
crisis and after-crisis periods. This shows that some of the improvements the BSE made over 
the period between the during the crisis and just after the crisis period were lost over the 
period leading to the automation of the BSE. However, some of the lost improvements were 
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then regained post-automation as the 1st difference value of the ADF is lower than the during 
the crisis albeit being still slightly higher than the post-crisis period. This finding provides 
further confirmation that the weak-form efficiency of the BSE improved marginally after the 
crisis period as compared to the before and during the crisis periods. 
 
TABLE 5.5: Results of Unit Root Tests between 2010 and 2017 
Data Series 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Test Philipps-Perron (PP) Test 
Level 1st Difference Level 1st Difference 
BSE ALSI  
2010 - 2013 (Pre-Automation) 
-14.17171*** 3.783901*** -19.31328*** -18.16145*** 
BSE ALSI  
2013 - 2017 (Post- Automation) 
-10.46073*** 3.629652*** -17.71279*** -17.49226*** 
Notes: significant at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***), respectively. 
 
For a more detailed analysis of the ADF and PP unit root tests, refer to tables 7.6 to 7.15 in 
the appendix. 
 
In keeping with the validating of results of the unit root tests, further tests were conducted 
based on the serial correlation test using correlograms in order to determine the presence of 
autocorrelation within the time series. A correlogram is fitting since it tests the main theory 
backing the EMH, namely the random walk hypothesis, and assumes that prices follow a 
random pattern. The results of this test are presented in Table 5.6 in the next section. 
 
5.5  Serial Correlations Test 
 
The serial correlations test was used to complement the unit root tests in order to determine 
the level of efficiency of the BSE. The reason is that, for a time series to follow a random walk, 
it is not enough that it contains a unit root, it must also be serially uncorrelated. In total, the 






The null and alternate hypotheses for the serial correlations tests are as follows: 
 
H0: Pk (AC) = 0 (There is an absence of serial correlation between price changes over 
successive q time lags – price changes are independent) 
H1: Pk (AC) ¹ 0 (There is positive or negative serial correlation between price changes 
over successive time lags – price changes are not independent) 
 
The results of the correlogram shown in Table 5.6 show that the autocorrelation (AC) test of 
all three time series, at greater than 50% of the lags, are not equal to 0. In addition, the Q-
statistic is greater than the 1% critical value of 2.576 at all points. The latter lags of the 2009 
– 2011 time series show a p-value higher than 0.05, which would normally indicate that we 
do not reject the null hypothesis. However, the BSE is still considered not weak-form efficient 
because the initial lags contain p-values lower than 0.01. In addition, the AC measure for the 
latter lags are rarely close to 0 and the Q-statistics are nowhere near the absolute critical 
value of 2.576, hence, violating the null hypothesis principle of independent price changes. 
Therefore, the time series are not stationary and price changes are not independent. 
 
TABLE 5.6: Results of the Serial Correlations Tests between 2005 and 2011 
BSE ALSI (2005 – 2007) 
Pre-Crisis  
BSE LSI (2007 – 2009) 
Crisis  
BSE ALSI (2009 – 2011) 
Post-Crisis 
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob  AC PAC Q-Stat Prob  AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
1 -0.378 -0.378 14.989 0.000  -0.335 -0.335 11.903 0.001  -0.335 -0.335 12.004 0.001 
2 -0.212 -0.414 19.770 0.000  -0.085 -0.222 12.680 0.002  -0.137 -0.281 14.039 0.001 
3 0.271 0.001 27.630 0.000  -0.118 -0.270 14.195 0.003  0.017 -0.166 14.070 0.003 
4 -0.196 -0.195 31.792 0.000  0.016 -0.203 14.223 0.007  0.030 -0.083 14.171 0.007 
5 -0.116 -0.267 33.264 0.000  0.107 -0.041 15.496 0.008  -0.053 -0.110 14.479 0.013 
6 0.215 -0.101 38.382 0.000  0.044 0.039 15.707 0.015  -0.051 -0.149 14.767 0.022 
7 -0.064 -0.077 38.834 0.000  -0.123 -0.085 17.407 0.015  -0.015 -0.166 14.791 0.039 
8 -0.102 -0.146 40.002 0.000  0.001 -0.049 17.407 0.026  0.078 -0.061 15.495 0.050 
9 0.140 -0.085 42.230 0.000  -0.051 -0.114 17.700 0.039  -0.122 -0.205 17.235 0.045 
10 -0.103 -0.180 43.466 0.000  0.156 0.052 20.524 0.025  0.067 -0.111 17.762 0.059 
11 0.092 0.051 44.444 0.000  -0.084 -0.056 21.351 0.030  0.061 -0.049 18.203 0.077 
12 -0.047 -0.120 44.698 0.000  -0.099 -0.163 22.514 0.032  -0.055 -0.104 18.561 0.100 
13 -0.041 -0.097 44.896 0.000  0.129 0.049 24.507 0.027  0.138 0.111 20.863 0.076 
14 0.068 -0.069 45.451 0.000  -0.097 -0.103 25.658 0.029  -0.072 0.024 21.496 0.090 





The results for the pre- and post-automation periods show a similar finding. The correlogram 
shown in Table 5.7 indicate that the autocorrelation (AC) test of the two time series, at greater 
than 50% of the lags, is not equal to 0. In addition, the Q-statistic is greater than the 1% 
absolute critical value of 2.576 at all points. Resultantly, it can be postulated that the time 
series pre- and post-automation are not stationary and price changes are not independent. 
Refer to Table 5.6 and table 5.7 for evidence of serial correlation in the series for before, 
during, and after financial crisis and those for pre- and post-automation respectively.   
 







16 0.072 -0.015 46.896 0.000  0.032 0.091 27.289 0.038  -0.042 -0.088 22.002 0.143 
17 0.061 0.007 47.353 0.000  -0.194 -0.134 32.029 0.015  -0.001 -0.092 22.002 0.185 
18 -0.102 -0.043 48.671 0.000  0.168 0.089 35.628 0.008  0.072 0.002 22.667 0.204 
19 -0.011 -0.072 48.685 0.000  -0.121 -0.100 37.508 0.007  0.006 0.051 22.671 0.252 
20 -0.027 -0.238 48.778 0.000  0.030 -0.105 37.626 0.010  -0.111 -0.070 24.288 0.230 
21 0.043 -0.071 49.025 0.000  0.121 0.105 39.571 0.008  0.157 0.083 27.578 0.153 
22 0.002 -0.154 49.026 0.001  -0.177 -0.129 43.759 0.004  -0.153 -0.118 30.716 0.102 
23 0.157 0.144 52.348 0.000  0.152 0.086 46.898 0.002  0.109 0.026 32.336 0.093 
24 -0.212 -0.174 58.446 0.000  -0.160 -0.121 50.402 0.001  0.054 0.086 32.738 0.110 
25 0.035 -0.114 58.613 0.000  0.045 -0.080 50.680 0.002  -0.041 0.067 32.972 0.132 
26 0.052 -0.153 58.995 0.000  0.032 -0.060 50.826 0.003  -0.091 -0.058 34.132 0.132 
27 0.013 0.044 59.017 0.000  -0.011 -0.040 50.843 0.004  0.004 -0.051 34.134 0.162 
28 0.027 0.064 59.123 0.001  0.012 -0.055 50.864 0.005  -0.072 -0.171 34.886 0.173 
29 -0.056 -0.026 59.582 0.001  0.043 0.034 51.128 0.007  0.128 -0.014 37.298 0.139 
30 -0.003 -0.054 59.584 0.001  -0.069 0.026 51.826 0.008  -0.092 -0.092 38.570 0.136 
31 0.010 0.075 59.597 0.002  0.104 -0.000 53.436 0.007  0.112 0.001 40.461 0.119 
32 0.006 0.009 59.602 0.002  -0.198 -0.115 59.408 0.002  0.004 -0.001 40.464 0.145 
33 -0.141 -0.199 62.649 0.001  0.199 0.083 65.512 0.001  -0.055 -0.012 40.936 0.161 
34 0.213 -0.020 69.751 0.000  -0.076 -0.079 66.423 0.001  -0.042 -0.151 41.218 0.184 
35 -0.042 0.111 70.024 0.000  -0.064 -0.055 67.079 0.001  0.076 -0.020 42.148 0.189 
36 -0.133 -0.001 72.870 0.000  0.133 0.018 69.940 0.001  0.084 0.084 43.297 0.188 
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BSE ALSI (2010 – 2013) 
Pre-Automation  
BSE ALSI (2013 – 2017) 
Post-Automation 
Lag AC PAC Q-Stat Prob  AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
1 -0.299 -0.299 16.498 0.000  -0.264 -0.264 12.873 0.000 
2 -0.156 -0.270 21.054 0.000  -0.176 -0.264 18.646 0.000 
3 0.053 -0.103 21.571 0.000  -0.033 -0.186 18.844 0.000 
4 -0.095 -0.183 23.261 0.000  -0.035 -0.184 19.068 0.001 
5 -0.015 -0.147 23.302 0.000  0.115 -0.007 21.584 0.001 
6 -0.002 -0.147 23.304 0.001  -0.068 -0.094 22.451 0.001 
7 0.030 -0.083 23.476 0.001  -0.105 -0.170 24.553 0.001 
8 0.007 -0.072 23.486 0.003  0.021 -0.132 24.638 0.002 
9 0.004 -0.050 23.490 0.005  0.125 0.018 27.642 0.001 
10 -0.101 -0.178 25.469 0.005  -0.106 -0.143 29.819 0.001 
11 0.063 -0.082 26.252 0.006  0.061 -0.002 30.550 0.001 
12 0.059 -0.021 26.940 0.008  -0.009 -0.020 30.567 0.002 
13 -0.004 0.008 26.943 0.013  -0.029 -0.049 30.738 0.004 
14 -0.047 -0.066 27.378 0.017  -0.075 -0.186 31.855 0.004 
15 -0.073 -0.157 28.460 0.019  0.132 0.058 35.374 0.002 
16 0.043 -0.101 28.840 0.025  -0.051 -0.070 35.901 0.003 
17 -0.042 -0.158 29.203 0.033  0.034 0.011 36.131 0.004 
18 0.177 0.086 35.564 0.008  -0.137 -0.193 39.968 0.002 
19 -0.086 -0.066 37.079 0.008  0.056 -0.017 40.615 0.003 
20 -0.071 -0.130 38.114 0.009  0.119 -0.023 43.558 0.002 
21 0.107 -0.014 40.517 0.006  -0.089 -0.073 45.200 0.002 
22 -0.070 -0.048 41.557 0.007  0.047 0.016 45.667 0.002 
23 0.027 0.007 41.714 0.010  -0.029 0.026 45.848 0.003 
24 0.010 -0.034 41.736 0.014  0.016 -0.043 45.899 0.005 
25 -0.022 -0.068 41.840 0.019  -0.030 -0.050 46.090 0.006 
26 -0.080 -0.163 43.216 0.018  -0.052 -0.116 46.666 0.008 
27 0.120 0.025 46.325 0.012  0.022 -0.038 46.771 0.010 
28 -0.141 -0.168 50.660 0.005  0.108 0.014 49.301 0.008 
29 0.136 -0.005 54.685 0.003  -0.124 -0.100 52.673 0.005 
30 0.017 -0.093 54.749 0.004  0.058 0.004 53.422 0.005 
31 -0.014 0.018 54.792 0.005  0.006 -0.040 53.431 0.007 
32 0.030 0.038 54.992 0.007  0.073 0.058 54.607 0.008 
33 -0.085 -0.003 56.634 0.006  -0.050 -0.001 55.176 0.009 
34 0.044 0.013 57.071 0.008  -0.156 -0.152 60.712 0.003 
35 0.002 0.029 57.072 0.011  0.069 -0.079 61.807 0.003 
36 -0.082 -0.101 58.619 0.010  0.096 0.010 63.942 0.003 
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The finding that prices changes are not independent requires the use of an approach that 
considers the trading mechanisms and the specific and common components of information. 
In the case of the weekly prices, this study proposes that the statistical properties of price 
changes rely on the interaction between the spread effects and the effects due to the gradual 
incorporation of common information.  
 
Therefore, unlike prior studies on the BSE, this study’s contribution is that it provides an 
innovative test procedure that minimises potential biases that arise from unwanted factors. 
Therefore, the variance ratio test is considered as the main and appropriate test to assess the 
weak-form efficiency of the BSE given the observed serial correlation in the series. In addition, 
the variance ratio test is considered is sensitive to serial correlation, is robust to time-varying 
volatilities and deviations to normality. Moreover, the variance ratio test is considered to be 
volatility-based compared to the runs tests and the unit root test. This feature makes the 
variance ratio test important in that most securities’ returns often display volatility and 
deviations from normality (Belaire-Franch et al., 2007).  
 
Thus, the variance ratio test, which is robust to heteroscedasticity and non-normality 
becomes important for this study compared to the runs test and the unit root test methods. 
The use of the variance ratio test is motivated by the finding in Poterba and Summers (1988)’s 
study which examined the power of the different random walk tests. It found that the 
variance ratios are amongst the most powerful tests, and that they are even more powerful 
than the Fama and French (1988)’s regression procedure.  
Prior studies by Poterba and Summers (1988), Fama and French (1988), Lo and MacKinlay 
(1988), Cochrane (1988) and Mobarek and Fiorante (2014) also argue that the unit root test 
has a very low power against stationary alternatives and that it is difficult to reject the null 
hypothesis of random walk. Therefore, the variance ratio tests are considered to be reliable 
in testing the random walk hypothesis and existence of a martingale in the BSE ALSI returns. 





5.6  Variance Ratio Test 
 
The weak-form market efficiency of the BSE is investigated by testing the random walk or 
martingale difference hypothesis using Lo and MacKinlay’s (1988) variance ratio tests. This 
study compares the variance ratios between different periods in order to determine the 
effects of the 2008 financial crisis and stock market automation on BSE’s efficiency. Two styles 
of variance ratio tests were employed in this study: 
 
1. Original Data Test – testing for a random walk in the BSE ALSI returns 
2. Bootstrap Signs Test – testing for the presence of a martingale in the BSE ALSI returns  
 
The bootstrap signs tests are used as a complement and consistency measure to the original 
data tests in order to reinforce the results of the latter. The bootstraps signs test aid in 
guarding against small sample bias – which suits this study, as it is divided into segments made 
up of a few years – hence if the change and magnitude of the results of the two tests over 
relevant time periods are similar, it strengthens the results and conclusion of the 
variance-ratio tests. 
 
The null and alternate hypothesis tested by both the original data and bootstrap signs tests 
are: 
 
 H0: VR(q) = 1 (The BSE is weak-form efficient) 
 H1: VR(q) ¹ 1 (The BSE is not weak-form efficient) 
The results are considered to be statistically significant at the 1% if the p-value exceeds 0.01. 
Therefore, if the p-values of the tests exceed 0.01, the BSE ALSI returns would be considered 
to follow a random walk and an index containing a martingale. Thus, the conclusion in that 
case, would be that the null hypothesis is not rejected and that the BSE is weak-form efficient. 
 
Table 5.8 below presents the variance ratio test statistics and p-values for the individual tests 
with the aim of formulating a conclusion of the effects of the 2008 financial crisis on BSE’s 
weak-form efficiency. For the pre-crisis period, the original data test shows a p-value of 
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0.0032. This shows that the null hypothesis should be rejected, leading to the conclusion that 
the BSE was not weak-form efficient prior to the 2008 financial crisis. However, step 
increments of 5 in both variance ratio tests indicate that small sample bias may be present in 
the BSE ALSI returns. As a consequence of that finding, the bootstrap signs test statistic 
becomes more reliable in this case. The bootstrap signs test clearly indicates that the BSE ALSI 
was weak-form market efficient prior to the crisis, as the p-value of 0.0190 exceeds the 0.01 
threshold. Moreover, the BSE remained weak-form efficient even during the crisis, as 
indicated by the bootstrap test’s p-value of 0.0191. 
 
The tests also indicate that the BSE became more efficient post-crisis. The results in Table 5.8 
show that the efficiency on the BSE strengthened after the crisis as the p-values of both the 
original data and bootstrap signs tests exceed 0.01, at 0.0174 and 0.0400 respectively. The p-
values are significantly higher after the crisis compared to before the crisis. In addition, 
despite the differences in the p-values of both tests, the changes in direction and strength are 
similar across the test period between the two tests. Hence, it can be concluded that the 
aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis had a significant positive effect on BSE’s weak-form 
market efficiency. 
 
TABLE 5.8: Results of the Variance Ratio Test between 2005 and 2011 
Data Series Test Maximum VR(q)* Maximum Z(q)* 
Probability at 
Maximum Z(q)* 
BSE ALSI  
2005 - 2007 (Pre-Crisis) 
Original Data 0.626003 3.777183*** 0.0032 
Signs (Bootstrap) 0.764706 2.376354** 0.0190 
BSE ALSI  
2007 - 2009 (Crisis) 
Original Data 0.672246 3.326339*** 0.0083 
Signs (Bootstrap) 0.679612 3.251587*** 0.0191 
BSE ALSI 
2009 - 2011 (Post-Crisis) 
Original Data 0.672420 3.340674*** 0.0174 
Signs (Bootstrap) 0.788462 2.157277** 0.0400 
Notes: significant at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***), respectively. 
 
Graphically, Figures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 below show the evolution of weak-form market efficiency 
transitioning between the pre-, during- and post-crisis periods, with the x-axis representing 
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the number of weeks. For instance, Figure 5.1 shows that market efficiency decreased and 
remained relatively stable over the pre-crisis period. This is likely due to the financial crisis 
beginning to unfold before turning into a full-blown crisis. 
 
Figure 5.2 illustrates that market efficiency in the BSE dropped significantly during the crisis. 
This can be attributed to the decrease in liquidity and trading volume on the BSE. It can also 
be attributed to the substantial downturn experienced by the Botswana economy during the 
crisis. However, market efficiency began to recover towards the end of the financial crisis 
once stricter financial regulations were put into place.  
 
Finally, Figure 5.3 depicts a significant increase in market efficiency after the crisis. Stricter 
regulations, and increased liquidity and trading volume due to the implementation of the CSD 
contributed to this increase. The conclusion that can be drawn from these figures is that the 
aftermath of the financial crisis led to a significant increase in BSE’s weak-form market 
efficiency. 
 
FIGURE 5.1:   Graphical Illustration of the Efficiency of the BSE ALSI Weekly Index between 

















FIGURE 5.2:   Graphical Illustration of the Efficiency of the BSE ALSI Weekly Index between 















FIGURE 5.3:   Graphical Illustration of the Efficiency of the BSE ALSI Weekly Index between 

















Next is an analysis of results based on the pre- and post- the automation of the BSE. Table 5.9 
presents the results grounded on the variance ratio tests on weak-form efficiency pre- and 
post-automation of the BSE. Results in Table 5.9 show the variance ratios, test statistics and 
p-values for the individual tests with the aim of generating a conclusion of the effects of 
stock-market automation on BSE’s weak-form efficiency. Both the original data and bootstrap 
signs variance ratio tests for the time period 2010 to 2013 produced p-values of 0.0195 and 
0.0110, respectively. Thus, both tests produced p-values above 0.01 and, as a result, the null 
hypothesis is not rejected, and it can be concluded that the BSE was already weak-form 
efficient prior to its automation. 
 
However, it is also vital to note that the original data and bootstrap signs variance ratio tests 
increased substantially in the post-automation period of 2013 to 2017, jumping from 0.0195 
to 0.0228 and from 0.0110 to 0.0300, respectively. As a result, the null hypothesis is not 
rejected, and it can be concluded that the BSE remained weak-form efficient post-
automation. As expected, an analysis of the variance ratios, critical values and p-values 
indicate that efficiency improved substantially after the introduction of the ATS to the BSE. 
Based on these findings, it can be concluded that the automation of the BSE had a significant 
positive effect on the BSE’s weak-form efficiency. It is also important to note that both tests 
changed equally in direction and magnitude when comparing the pre- and post-automation 
period. 
 
For more detailed results of the original data and bootstrap signs variance ratio tests, refer to 
tables 7.21 to 7.30 in the appendix. 
 
TABLE 5.9:    Results of the Variance Ratio Test between 2010 and 2017 
Data Series Test Maximum VR(q)* Maximum Z(q)* 
Probability at 
Maximum Z(q)* 
BSE ALSI  
2010 - 2013 (Pre-Automation) 
Original Data 0.182776 3.265309** 0.0195 
Signs (Bootstrap) 0.747253 3.409747** 0.0110 
BSE ALSI  
2013 - 2017 (Post-Automation) 
Original Data 0.193883 3.220929** 0.0228 
Signs (Bootstrap) 0.813187 2.520248** 0.0300 
Notes: significant at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***), respectively. 
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Graphically, Figures 5.4 and 5.5 below illustrate the developments in the weak-form market 
efficiency of the BSE before and after automation, with the x-axis representing the number 
of weeks. Figure 5.4 indicates that BSE’s efficiency was relatively stable throughout the pre-
automation period. However, market efficiency registered a spike at the end of this period. 
This spike coincides with the implementation and initial rollout of the ATS. Thus, it is apparent 
that the introduction of the ATS had a positive impact on BSE’s weak-form efficiency. 
 
Figure 5.5 exhibited a consistent increase in BSE’s market efficiency throughout the period 
between 2013–2017. The observed increase in market efficiency could, amongst other 
factors, be attributed to the steady improvements of the ATS over the years, which in turn 
could have led to a further increase in market efficiency. This is evidenced by the spike at the 
far-right side of the graphical presentation in Figure 5.4. The evolution of market efficiency 
illustrated by Figures 5.4 and 5.5 yields a clear conclusion that the automation of the BSE had 
a significant, continuous positive effect on BSE’s weak-form efficiency. 
 
FIGURE 5.4:   Graphical Illustration of the Efficiency of the BSE ALSI Weekly Index between 


















FIGURE 5.5:   Graphical Illustration of the Efficiency of the BSE ALSI Weekly Index between 
















TABLE 5.10:   Consolidation of results across the different market efficiency tests 
Market Efficiency Test 
The Effect of the Following Event on BSE’s Market Efficiency 
2008 Financial Crisis Stock Market Automation 
Runs tests Negative Negative 
Unit Root test Positive Positive 
Serial Correlations test Positive Positive 
Variance Ratio tests Positive Positive 
 
5.7 Discussion of Results Based on the Variance Ratio Tests  
 
Owing to the above view, the remaining sections of this chapter focus on a summary of the 
findings discussed using the tests conducted based on the variance ratio test. 
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5.7.1  A Discussion of the Impact of 2008 Financial Crisis on BSE’s Efficiency 
 
Using the bootstrap signs, this study found that the BSE was weak-form efficient prior to and 
during the crisis. In addition the bootstraps sign tests indicated that the BSE became more 
efficient post-crisis when compared to the pre-crisis period.  
 
The findings of an improvement in BSE’s efficiency post-crisis are consistent with the findings 
of Sengonul and Degirmen (2011) and Rizvi and Arshad (2016). However, the findings are 
contrary to those of Anagnostidis et al., (2016), Ali and Afzal (2012) and Lim et al., (2008) who 
found that the crisis had a negative impact on market efficiency. These results are also 
contrary to the Sharma and Seth (2011) study which found no difference in market efficiency 
before and after the crisis.  Prior studies on the weak-form efficiency of BSE did not segment 
the entire period into pre-, during and post-crisis periods. Hence, a comparison could not be 
made in that regard. 
 
However, the improvement on the BSE’s efficiency post-crisis is likely to have been caused by 
the immediate and effective regulatory response by the government of Botswana and 
financial regulators to the 2008 financial crisis. The response was aimed at improving and 
strengthening Botswana’s entire financial sector so as to prevent future exogenous shocks 
from negatively impacting the economy. The increased regulation was also aimed at 
promoting the active improvement of the BSE’s attractiveness to domestic and foreign 
investors, its operations and efficiency. The CSD was implemented in 2008 and share 
dematerialisation for domestic and foreign stocks was advancing at a satisfactory pace (BSE, 
2009). The major advantage of the CSD was that the trade settlement time shortened from 
T+5 to T+3. This enabled the BSE to conform to international standards which, in turn, aided 
in reducing settlement risk. As a result, BSE’s efficiency registered an improvement. 
 
In addition, the Bank of Botswana enhanced the risk-based regulatory and supervisory system 
that prevented banks from engaging in excessively risky activities which exposed them to 
exogenous global shocks. The enhancements of these systems were supported by the 
implementation of the Basel I Banking rules in 2009 (Jefferis, 2010). Another measure that 
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was taken was the privatisation of financial and banking state-owned institutions, such as the 
Botswana Savings Bank and National Development Bank (Jefferis, 2010). 
 
Furthermore, the introduction of exchange traded funds (ETF) to the BSE in 2009 led to a 
noteworthy increase in market liquidity, enhancing the depth and breadth of the market (BSE, 
2009). In addition, ETF listing fees on the BSE were competitive compared to the JSE, hence 
reducing costs of trading and improving market efficiency. The BSE also reduced its minimum 
trading requirement securities from 100 units to 1 unit and introduced ETF Investor Schemes 
which allowed retail investors to also participate in ETF investments. These policies led to a 
considerable increase in trading volume and improved market efficiency (BSE, 2009). 
 
In 2010, the BSE sponsored 6 financial market courses by partnering with Geometric 
Progression CC of South Africa. The objective was to increase the level of knowledge and 
understanding of BSE financial market participants. The course covered the following topics: 
equities, debt, derivatives and ETFs (Botswana Stock Exchange [BSE], 2010). These courses 
enabled greater information proliferation to the BSE, thereby improving its efficiency. 
 
The bond market also materialised in the second quarter of 2010 and there were already 36 
bonds listed on the BSE, most of which were government bonds. The addition of new financial 
instruments on the BSE attracted risk-averse investors who wanted to invest on the BSE. Thus, 
the increase in dynamism of the BSE led to an increase in market participants, trading volumes 
and, ultimately, an improvement in market efficiency.  
 
5.7.2  A Discussion of the Impact of Automation on BSE’s Efficiency 
 
The findings from the variance ratio tests show that the introduction of automation on the 
BSE in mid-2012, and its effective functioning in mid-2013, led to an improvement of BSE’s 
efficiency. This falls in line with the aforesaid conclusion that the BSE became weak-form 
efficient following the 2008 financial crisis, with its efficiency being higher than before the 
crisis. The introduction of the ATS further supported the continuous increase of BSE’s 
efficiency. The finding that the BSE’s efficiency improved further as a result of automation are 
consistent with those of Dicle and Levendis (2013), Stephen et al., (2013), Mwangi (2015), 
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Naidu and Rozeff (1994) and Jiang et al., (2002), but contrary to studies by Sioud and Hmaied 
(2003) and Mensah et al., (2014) whose studies found an insignificant impact. 
 
However, numerous reasons could be proffered regarding automation’s role in the 
improvement of the weak-form efficiency of the BSE. For example, it could be argued that the 
improvement could have been a result of the ATS’s guarantee of an average order latency of 
5 milliseconds, which is magnitudes lower than the open-floor trading system. Additionally, 
this could have been because of the ATS’s automated order submission interface and its 
guarantee of a peak order rate of 150 orders per second—amounting to 200,000 orders and 
20,000 trades per day. Moreover, the orders and trades can be executed on a number of 
financial instruments—equities, bonds and ETFs (Botswana Stock Exchange [BSE], 2013). 
Finally, the ATS enabled the dissemination of real-time market data to brokers and investors, 
and more effective and efficient communication between brokers and investors. This led to 
more effective information dissemination, an increase in informed trading decisions, faster 
trades and instant settlements.  
 
Thus, the above factors aided in enhancing the BSE’s efficiency. For example, ATS facilitated 
the access to different order types available in the BSE, therefore adding a layer of 
convenience to brokers and investors. This was done through the introduction of limit orders, 
market orders and stop losses (BSE, 2013). Facilitation of trade enabled market participants 
to broaden the scope of possible entry strategies into the BSE, thus attracting more domestic 
and foreign investors. As a result, trading volume and liquidity increased, leading to an 
improvement in BSE’s efficiency. Liquidity and stock market turnover increased by 5.9% to 
10.6% one year after the implementation of the ATS, respectively. 
 
Market efficiency further improved in 2013 due to an extension of regular trading sessions of 
the BSE, from 1 hour 45 minutes to 2 hours 45 minutes. In addition, the BSE improved their 
website, introduced internet-based trading and rolled out information dissemination through 
data vendors. The policies led to increased market participants as the number of account 
openings in the CSD was 20,027 in 2013 compared to 17,368 in 2012, translating to a 13.55% 
increase (BSE, 2013). Hence, the increase in the number of traders and brokers in the BSE 




In 2015, the BSE put into effect the complete dematerialisation of listed securities. The 
advantages of such a policy lie in the reduction of risk of physical stock certificate fraud, 
ensuring that information is readily available to market participants. This enables investors to 
trade anytime and from anywhere by communicating with their brokers, as full 
dematerialisation would nullify the need to deposit certificates at the CSD. Dematerialisation 
further reduces inefficiencies as it does away with the dual-trading system in which two 
separate share registers have to be maintained: one for the dematerialised securities and one 
for the physical stock certificates (Botswana Stock Exchange [BSE], 2015).  
 
In 2016, the BSE significantly progressed with the centralisation, clearing and settlement of 
bonds listed in the BSE. This plan was set forth in order to improve market efficiencies, reduce 
costs and improve the attractiveness of the domestic bond market to foreign investors. In 
addition, the BSE progressed with the development of new products created to promote 
liquidity and depth of the BSE. The BSE partnered with an international bank, namely Saxo 
Bank, in order to provide local investors access to international investment products 
(Botswana Stock Exchange [BSE], 2016). This, in turn, attracted investors, improved trading 
volume, increased liquidity and generated improved price discovery. The result was a 
compounding improvement of the efficiency of the BSE.  
 
The introduction of the ATS and its continuous enhancements led to an improvement of the 
efficiency of the BSE. The following results were achieved in the BSE between 2012 and 2016, 
which provides a background for the observed increased efficiency as a direct, and potentially 
indirect, result of the ATS: 
• Yearly Account Openings increased from 17,638 to 78,837. 
• Equity Market Capitalisation increased from P412,349m to P421,313m. 
• Average Daily Turnover increased from P894.7m to P2,541.2m. 
• Turnover/Market Cap increased from an index of 0.79 to 1.47. 
• Number of Shares Traded increased from 409.9m to 778.2m. 
• Units of ETFs Traded increased from 0.223m to 1.020m. 
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CHAPTER 6 – CONCLUSION 
 
6.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter will begin by providing a summary of the findings of this study. In addition, this 
study’s relevant contributions to literature concerning the BSE, 2008 financial crisis and ATS 
will be stated. Finally, the limitations of the study and recommendations for future 
researchers will be discussed. 
 
6.2 Summary of Results 
 
In summary, the runs tests indicate that the BSE was weak-form efficient prior to the crisis 
but that it lost its weak-form efficiency during the crisis and recovered some of it post-crisis. 
On net, the runs tests indicate that the BSE’s efficiency was negatively affected by the 2008 
financial crisis. In addition, the runs tests also show that the introduction of the ATS had a 
negative effect on the efficiency of the BSE, as it decreased post-automation. 
 
As for the unit root tests, both the ADF and PP tests demonstrate that BSE was not efficient 
before or after the financial crisis. However, it clearly shows that BSE became more efficient 
post-crisis. Hence, the unit root tests conclude that the 2008 financial crisis had a positive 
effect on BSE’s efficiency. Moreover, both the ADF and PP tests indicate that the BSE became 
more efficient after the introduction of the ATS. Hence, the unit root tests suggest that BSE’s 
efficiency improved as a result of its automation. 
 
The serial correlations tests suggest that market efficiency significantly improved after the 
crisis. The findings based on this test correlate to the unit root tests. The serial correlations 
tests indicate that BSE’s efficiency improved as a result of the 2008 financial crisis. 
Additionally, the serial correlations tests indicate that BSE’s efficiency improved considerably 
after the ATS was introduced. Likewise, the serial correlations tests and the unit root tests 
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follow the same pattern. Resultantly, the serial correlations tests show that BSE’s efficiency 
improved as a direct result of its automation.  
 
The variance ratio tests, using the bootstrap signs test, suggest that market efficiency 
improved significantly after the crisis. In addition, the variance ratio tests demonstrated that 
the BSE became more efficient after the introduction of the ATS. These results correspond to 
the results obtained by the unit root and serial correlations tests. Hence, the overall results 
provide overwhelming evidence that the introduction of the numerous regulations aimed at 
mitigating the effect of the 2008 financial crisis,  and the automation of the BSE, had a 
significant positive effect on BSE’s efficiency. 
 
The only contradicting result comes from the runs test, which states that both the 2008 
financial crisis and stock market automation significantly decreased the BSE’s efficiency. The 
unit roots tests, serial correlations tests and variance ratio tests all agree that the 2008 
financial crisis and automation significantly improved BSE’s efficiency.  
 
However, since past literature argue that the variance ratio tests is the best model for testing 
the EMH at its weak-form, this study uses the variance ratio tests’ results as a basis for the 
discussion on the magnitude of the effect of the 2008 financial crisis and stock market 
automation on the BSE’s market efficiency.  
 
It is important to note that, owing to serial correlation in the data and the shortcoming of the 
runs test, and unit root test under such situations, this study presented the results based on 
the runs test and unit root tests as sanity checks for the variance ratio tests. As explained in 
other sections of the study, the runs test, for example, is not robust to slight differences 
between data sets due to the high incidence of rounding errors associated with this type of 






6.3  Summary of Contributions to Literature 
 
The sole publicly available study testing market efficiency on the BSE was conducted by 
Chiwira and Muyambiri (2012). Even so, the data employed in their studies only spanned for 
a period of four years, from 2004 to 2008. Hence, this study offers an updated status of BSE’s 
efficiency by using data stretching through 2017.  
 
Moreover, this study is the longest conducted on the BSE, as the sample period was from 
January 2005 to January 2017, a total of twelve years. Even when splitting the study into its 
individual components, the two distinct experiments remain the longest studies ever 
conducted on the BSE: between 2005 and 2011 for testing the effects of the 2008 financial 
crisis on BSE’s efficiency, a total of 6 years; and between 2010 and 2017 for testing the effects 
of stock market automation on BSE’s efficiency, a total of 7 years. 
 
In addition, Chiwira and Muyambiri’s (2012) study used the runs test, unit root test and serial 
correlations test for analysing market efficiency on the BSE. This study uses all tests employed 
by Chiwira and Muyambiri’s (2012) study, but also adds the variance ratio tests, which is 
considered to be more accurate than the first three tests. Hence, this study employed more 
tests than any previous studies have done, therefore improving the certainty of results. 
 
This study is one of a kind as it is the only study testing for the effects of the 2008 financial 
crisis on market efficiency on the BSE. In addition, it is the only study testing for the effects of 
the introduction of the ATS on market efficiency on the BSE. Finally, this study provides a 
unique approach by combining the 2008 financial crisis and automation, not as mutually 
exclusive events, but with automation being a response to the crisis. 
 
This study adds theoretical value to existing literature regarding the BSE, the 2008 financial 
crisis and stock market automation. This study has established that BSE’s efficiency has 
significantly increased over time. In addition, this study answers research questions not 
answered in prior literature: the 2008 financial crisis and stock market automation had a 
significant positive effect on market efficiency on the BSE. 
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6.4  Recommendations for Future Studies 
 
Most of the studies on weak-form market efficiency focus on the entire market over the entire 
period under consideration without any segmentation, although the economy grows in 
cycles. The fact that the economy is affected by business cycles means that each cycle might 
affect the efficiency of the market differently. Furthermore, business cycles might affect 
different industries and sectors differently. Owing to this argument, future studies should 
consider testing the impact of the 2008 financial crisis and stock market automation on 
indexes created based on individual industries or sectors of the BSE. By focusing on individual 
industries or sectors, future studies would be able determine which of the industries or 
sectors were affected by the crisis the most and which benefitted the most from automation. 
Botswana’s financial regulators can then use this information to implement policies to 
cushion future financial crises. In addition, they can use the information to aid sectors which 
have not significantly benefitted from automation to absorb more of its positive impacts. 
 
Since further improvements, such as the development of an integrated data analysis and 
reporting system and centralisation of trading, clearing and settlement of bonds at the BSE 
are being made to the BSE ATS, such policies are likely to theoretically lead to increased 
efficiency of a stock market. Consequently, future research should look at replicating tests 
conducted in this study, using a much longer sample period—possibly also using daily and 
monthly data in addition to weekly data, in order to determine whether the ATS policies will 
have a significant positive effect on the efficiency of the BSE. Furthermore, future studies will 
be in a much better position to use a longer sample period to obtain more accurate results 
and also to allow for learning effects as the market and its participants adjust to the new 
policy and regulation changes. 
 
Automated trading systems theoretically cushion the effects of GDP volatility on stock market 
returns. Given the recent history of considerable fluctuations of Botswana’s GDP, future 
researchers should consider testing the effect of the ATS as a cushion to GDP fluctuations on 
the BSE. This can be done by testing the correlation between GDP fluctuations and the BSE 
ALSI fluctuations to the introduction of the ATS, and the same test for the period after the 




In addition, a review of literature on weak-form efficiency on the stock exchanges in sub-
Saharan Africa, with the exception of South Africa and Nigeria, show that these exchanges 
have been poorly researched. Furthermore, the existing studies are also outdated, and usually 
do not correspond to evolving market conditions and new policy regulations. Therefore, 
market efficiency of poorly researched sub-Saharan African countries should be tested with 
more recent data to determine the progression of market efficiency over time. In addition, 
more accurate tests, such as the Lo and MacKinlay (1988) variance ratio test, should be 
employed to give more robust conclusions regarding market efficiency. These results can 
enable future researchers to postulate steps and policies required to be undertaken in order 
to improve the informational efficiency of the markets in question. 
 
6.5  Conclusion 
 
The principal aim of this study was to investigate and determine the impact of the 2008 
financial crisis and stock market automation on market efficiency on the BSE. This study used 
the runs test, unit root test, serial correlations test and variance ratio test using the BSE ALSI 
weekly data for the period 2005 - 2017. The results of the tests overwhelmingly agree that 
the BSE became more informationally efficient subsequent to the crisis and following the 
introduction of the ATS.  
 
In addition, prior literature asserts that the variance ratio test is the most powerful tool that 
can be used for testing for the EMH. Therefore, using the variance ratio tests as the basis for 
conclusion, this study concludes that the BSE became more informationally efficient over 
time, and evolved from not being efficient into being weak-form efficient.  
 
The increase in efficiency could be attributed to the effective policy responses by the 
government of Botswana and financial regulators to the 2008 financial crisis. One of the 
policies called for automation of the BSE. The introduction of the ATS to the BSE had a 
significant positive impact on BSE’s efficiency due to an increase in market participants, 
improved information dissemination, improved price discovery, improved trading volume 
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and liquidity due to faster trading and improved communication. Furthermore, the 
continuous policies aimed at improving the ATS, such as increasing trading time from 1 hour 
and 45 minutes to 2 hours and 45 minutes, together caused the BSE to become all the more 
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Table 7.1:    Runs Test of the BSE Weekly Share Index Returns (2005 – 2007) 
 
Runs Test 
 BSE ALSI 
2005 – 2007 
Test Valuea 0.789550% 
Cases < Test Value 66 
Cases >= Test Value 37 
Total Cases 103 
Number of Runs 38 
Z -2.243 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .025 
a. Median (Cut-off Point) 
 
 
Table 7.2:    Runs Test of the BSE Weekly Share Index Returns (2007 – 2009) 
 
Runs Test 
 BSE ALSI 
2007 – 2009 
Test Valuea 0.0054% 
Cases < Test Value 52 
Cases >= Test Value 52 
Total Cases 104 
Number of Runs 16 
Z -7.292 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000 




Table 7.3:    Runs Test of the BSE Weekly Share Index Returns (2009 – 2011) 
 
Runs Test 
 BSE ALSI 
2009 – 2011 
Test Valuea 0.0003% 
Cases < Test Value 52 
Cases >= Test Value 53 
Total Cases 105 
Number of Runs 28 
Z -5.001 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
a. Median (Cut-off Point) 
 
 
Table 7.4:    Runs Test of the BSE Weekly Share Index Returns (2010 – 2013) 
 
Runs Test 
 BSE ALSI 
2010 – 2013 
Test Valuea 0.0831% 
Cases < Test Value 91 
Cases >= Test Value 92 
Total Cases 183 
Number of Runs 67 
Z -3.780 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000 




Table 7.5:    Runs Test of the BSE Weekly Share Index Returns (2010 – 2013) 
 
Runs Test 
 BSE ALSI 
2013 – 2017 
Test Valuea 0.0504% 
Cases < Test Value 91 
Cases >= Test Value 92 
Total Cases 183 
Number of Runs 61 
Z -4.670 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
a. Median (Cut-off Point) 
 
 
Table 7.6:    ADF Test of the BSE Weekly Share Index Returns (2005 – 2007) 
 
Null Hypothesis: D(LR_CRISIS_05_07) has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=12) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -12.66104  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.052411  
 5% level  -3.455376  
 10% level  -3.153438  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LR_CRISIS_05_07,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/21/18   Time: 23:26   
Sample (adjusted): 2/04/2005 12/29/2006  
Included observations: 100 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(LR_CRISIS_05_07(-1)) -1.961633 0.154935 -12.66104 0.0000 
D(LR_CRISIS_05_07(-1),2) 0.421181 0.093819 4.489312 0.0000 
C 0.000651 0.002943 0.221177 0.8254 
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@TREND("1/07/2005") -1.03E-05 4.84E-05 -0.211985 0.8326 
     
      
 
Table 7.7:    PP Test of the BSE Weekly Share Index Returns (2005 – 2007) 
 
Null Hypothesis: D(LR_CRISIS_05_07) has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Bandwidth: 2.54 (Andrews automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
     
     Phillips-Perron test statistic -17.61090  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.051450  
 5% level  -3.454919  
 10% level  -3.153171  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
     Residual variance (no correction)  0.000224 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel)  0.000109 
     
          
     
Phillips-Perron Test Equation   
Dependent Variable: D(LR_CRISIS_05_07,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/21/18   Time: 23:28   
Sample (adjusted): 1/28/2005 12/29/2006  
Included observations: 101 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(LR_CRISIS_05_07(-1)) -1.384673 0.094219 -14.69624 0.0000 
C 0.000448 0.003141 0.142608 0.8869 
@TREND("1/07/2005") -6.86E-06 5.19E-05 -0.132070 0.8952 
     
      
 
Table 7.8:    ADF Test of the BSE Weekly Share Index Returns (2007 – 2009) 
 
Null Hypothesis: D(LR_CRISIS_07_09) has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 2 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=12) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -9.225601  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.052411  
 5% level  -3.455376  
 10% level  -3.153438  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
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Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LR_CRISIS_07_09,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/21/18   Time: 23:29   
Sample (adjusted): 2/02/2007 12/26/2008  
Included observations: 100 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(LR_CRISIS_07_09(-1)) -2.115532 0.229311 -9.225601 0.0000 
D(LR_CRISIS_07_09(-1),2) 0.633856 0.173008 3.663734 0.0004 
D(LR_CRISIS_07_09(-2),2) 0.281434 0.101350 2.776847 0.0066 
C 0.002163 0.006993 0.309275 0.7578 
@TREND("1/07/2005") -1.72E-05 4.37E-05 -0.392666 0.6954 
     
      
 
Table 7.9:    PP Test of the BSE Weekly Share Index Returns (2007 – 2009) 
 
Null Hypothesis: D(LR_CRISIS_07_09) has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Bandwidth: 1.58 (Andrews automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
     
     Phillips-Perron test statistic -14.31918  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.050509  
 5% level  -3.454471  
 10% level  -3.152909  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
     Residual variance (no correction)  0.000169 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel)  0.000153 
     
          
     
Phillips-Perron Test Equation   
Dependent Variable: D(LR_CRISIS_07_09,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/21/18   Time: 23:30   
Sample (adjusted): 1/19/2007 12/26/2008  
Included observations: 102 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(LR_CRISIS_07_09(-1)) -1.339223 0.095157 -14.07386 0.0000 
C 0.000907 0.007063 0.128356 0.8981 
@TREND("1/07/2005") -7.48E-06 4.44E-05 -0.168593 0.8665 
     





Table 7.10:    ADF Test of the BSE Weekly Share Index Returns (2009 – 2011) 
 
Null Hypothesis: D(LR_CRISIS_09_11) has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=12) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -10.79009  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.050509  
 5% level  -3.454471  
 10% level  -3.152909  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LR_CRISIS_09_11,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/21/18   Time: 23:31   
Sample (adjusted): 1/23/2009 12/31/2010  
Included observations: 102 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(LR_CRISIS_09_11(-1)) -1.745913 0.161807 -10.79009 0.0000 
D(LR_CRISIS_09_11(-1),2) 0.302936 0.098920 3.062434 0.0028 
C 0.000433 0.010395 0.041698 0.9668 
@TREND("1/07/2005") -1.79E-06 3.95E-05 -0.045424 0.9639 
     
      
 
Table 7.11:    PP Test of the BSE Weekly Share Index Returns (2009 – 2011) 
 
Null Hypothesis: D(LR_CRISIS_09_11) has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Bandwidth: 1.83 (Andrews automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
     
     Phillips-Perron test statistic -14.54665  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.049586  
 5% level  -3.454032  
 10% level  -3.152652  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
     Residual variance (no correction)  0.000144 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel)  0.000126 
     
          
     
Phillips-Perron Test Equation   
Dependent Variable: D(LR_CRISIS_09_11,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/21/18   Time: 23:32   
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Sample (adjusted): 1/16/2009 12/31/2010  
Included observations: 103 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(LR_CRISIS_09_11(-1)) -1.336547 0.094102 -14.20310 0.0000 
C -0.001024 0.010587 -0.096706 0.9232 
@TREND("1/07/2005") 4.03E-06 4.03E-05 0.099961 0.9206 
     
      
 
Table 7.12:    ADF Test of the BSE Weekly Share Index Returns (2010 – 2013) 
 
Null Hypothesis: D(LR_AUTO_10_13) has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=13) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -14.17171  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.009849  
 5% level  -3.434984  
 10% level  -3.141481  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LR_AUTO_10_13,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/21/18   Time: 23:33   
Sample (adjusted): 1/22/2010 6/28/2013  
Included observations: 180 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(LR_AUTO_10_13(-1)) -1.661192 0.117219 -14.17171 0.0000 
D(LR_AUTO_10_13(-1),2) 0.274604 0.072572 3.783901 0.0002 
C 0.000688 0.004354 0.157922 0.8747 
@TREND("1/07/2005") -1.74E-06 1.22E-05 -0.142507 0.8868 
     
      
 
Table 7.13:    PP Test of the BSE Weekly Share Index Returns (2010 – 2013) 
 
Null Hypothesis: D(LR_AUTO_10_13) has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Bandwidth: 2.01 (Andrews automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
     
     Phillips-Perron test statistic -19.31328  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.009558  
 5% level  -3.434844  
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 10% level  -3.141399  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
     Residual variance (no correction)  7.66E-05 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel)  5.47E-05 
     
          
     
Phillips-Perron Test Equation   
Dependent Variable: D(LR_AUTO_10_13,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/21/18   Time: 23:33   
Sample (adjusted): 1/15/2010 6/28/2013  
Included observations: 181 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(LR_AUTO_10_13(-1)) -1.300175 0.071590 -18.16145 0.0000 
C 5.96E-05 0.004467 0.013346 0.9894 
@TREND("1/07/2005") -2.96E-08 1.26E-05 -0.002355 0.9981 
     
      
 
Table 7.14:    ADF Test of the BSE Weekly Share Index Returns (2013 – 2017) 
 
Null Hypothesis: D(LR_AUTO_13_17) has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 3 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=13) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -10.46073  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.010440  
 5% level  -3.435269  
 10% level  -3.141649  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LR_AUTO_13_17,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/21/18   Time: 23:35   
Sample (adjusted): 8/09/2013 12/30/2016  
Included observations: 178 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(LR_AUTO_13_17(-1)) -2.276504 0.217624 -10.46073 0.0000 
D(LR_AUTO_13_17(-1),2) 0.853865 0.177225 4.817972 0.0000 
D(LR_AUTO_13_17(-2),2) 0.463026 0.127567 3.629657 0.0004 
D(LR_AUTO_13_17(-3),2) 0.192512 0.074930 2.569236 0.0110 
C 0.001365 0.004269 0.319675 0.7496 
@TREND("1/07/2005") -2.54E-06 7.92E-06 -0.320347 0.7491 
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Table 7.15:    PP Test of the BSE Weekly Share Index Returns (2013 – 2017) 
 
Null Hypothesis: D(LR_AUTO_13_17) has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Bandwidth: 1.73 (Andrews automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
     
     Phillips-Perron test statistic -17.71279  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.009558  
 5% level  -3.434844  
 10% level  -3.141399  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
     Residual variance (no correction)  3.27E-05 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel)  2.99E-05 
     
          
 
     
Phillips-Perron Test Equation   
Dependent Variable: D(LR_AUTO_13_17,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/21/18   Time: 23:35   
Sample (adjusted): 7/19/2013 12/30/2016  
Included observations: 181 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(LR_AUTO_13_17(-1)) -1.265658 0.072355 -17.49226 0.0000 
C 0.000423 0.004411 0.095802 0.9238 
@TREND("1/07/2005") -7.45E-07 8.21E-06 -0.090732 0.9278 
     


















































































































































































































































Table 7.21:    Variance Ratio Test of the BSE Weekly Share Index (2005 – 2007) 
 
Null Hypothesis: LR_CRISIS_05_07 is a random walk  
Date: 04/22/18   Time: 00:29   
Sample: 1/07/2005 12/30/2016   
Included observations: 102 (after adjustments)  
Standard error estimates assume no heteroscedasticity 
Lags specified as grid: min=2, max=101, step=5  
     
     Joint Tests Value Df Probability 
Max |z| (at period 2)*  3.777183  102  0.0032 
Wald (Chi-Square)  33.53066  20  0.0295 
     
Individual Tests    
Period Var. Ratio Std. Error z-Statistic Probability 
 2  0.626003  0.099015 -3.777183  0.0002 
 7  0.199694  0.269869 -2.965538  0.0030 
 12  0.106792  0.371214 -2.406183  0.0161 
 17  0.073565  0.450554 -2.056214  0.0398 
 22  0.050651  0.517949 -1.832902  0.0668 
 27  0.050554  0.577560 -1.643892  0.1002 
 32  0.059166  0.631583 -1.489645  0.1363 
 37  0.044842  0.681343 -1.401874  0.1610 
 42  0.052777  0.727714 -1.301643  0.1930 
 47  0.040202  0.771304 -1.244383  0.2134 
 52  0.064305  0.812562 -1.151538  0.2495 
 57  0.041719  0.851824 -1.124975  0.2606 
 62  0.052345  0.889357 -1.065551  0.2866 
 67  0.062036  0.925368 -1.013611  0.3108 
 72  0.050290  0.960031 -0.989250  0.3225 
 77  0.083480  0.993485 -0.922530  0.3563 
 82  0.101094  1.025850 -0.876256  0.3809 
 87  0.142513  1.057224 -0.811074  0.4173 
 92  0.185518  1.087694 -0.748815  0.4540 
 97  0.191732  1.117333 -0.723390  0.4694 
     
     *Probability approximation using studentized maximum modulus with 
        parameter value 20 and infinite degrees of freedom 
     
Test Details (Mean = 0.000131780122208)  
     
     Period Variance Var. Ratio Obs.  
 1  0.00026 --  102  
 2  0.00016  0.62600  101  
 7  5.2E-05  0.19969  96  
 12  2.8E-05  0.10679  91  
 17  1.9E-05  0.07356  86  
 22  1.3E-05  0.05065  81  
 27  1.3E-05  0.05055  76  
 32  1.6E-05  0.05917  71  
 37  1.2E-05  0.04484  66  
 42  1.4E-05  0.05278  61  
 47  1.1E-05  0.04020  56  
 52  1.7E-05  0.06430  51  
 57  1.1E-05  0.04172  46  
 62  1.4E-05  0.05235  41  
 67  1.6E-05  0.06204  36  
 72  1.3E-05  0.05029  31  
 77  2.2E-05  0.08348  26  
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 82  2.7E-05  0.10109  21  
 87  3.7E-05  0.14251  16  
 92  4.9E-05  0.18552  11  
 97  5.0E-05  0.19173  6  
     
      
 
Table 7.22:    Variance Ratio Test (Original Data) of the BSE Weekly Share Index (2007 – 
2009) 
 
Null Hypothesis: LR_CRISIS_07_09 is a random walk  
Date: 04/22/18   Time: 00:31   
Sample: 1/07/2005 12/30/2016   
Included observations: 103 (after adjustments)  
Standard error estimates assume no heteroskedasticity 
Lags specified as grid: min=2, max=102, step=5  
     
     Joint Tests Value Df Probability 
Max |z| (at period 2)*  3.326339  103  0.0083 
Wald (Chi-Square)  801.9321  21  0.0000 
     
Individual Tests    
Period Var. Ratio Std. Error z-Statistic Probability 
 2  0.672246  0.098533 -3.326339  0.0009 
 7  0.267385  0.268555 -2.727984  0.0064 
 12  0.182248  0.369407 -2.213688  0.0269 
 17  0.144476  0.448361 -1.908112  0.0564 
 22  0.119515  0.515428 -1.708258  0.0876 
 27  0.092224  0.574749 -1.579430  0.1142 
 32  0.096790  0.628510 -1.437067  0.1507 
 37  0.092025  0.678028 -1.339140  0.1805 
 42  0.081800  0.724173 -1.267930  0.2048 
 47  0.082154  0.767551 -1.195812  0.2318 
 52  0.060415  0.808608 -1.161979  0.2452 
 57  0.062552  0.847679 -1.105900  0.2688 
 62  0.054272  0.885029 -1.068584  0.2853 
 67  0.072505  0.920865 -1.007199  0.3138 
 72  0.116480  0.955359 -0.924804  0.3551 
 77  0.135257  0.988651 -0.874670  0.3818 
 82  0.162207  1.020858 -0.820676  0.4118 
 87  0.313355  1.052079 -0.652655  0.5140 
 92  0.319499  1.082401 -0.628696  0.5295 
 97  0.601270  1.111896 -0.358603  0.7199 
 102  0.592399  1.140629 -0.357348  0.7208 
     
     *Probability approximation using studentized maximum modulus with 
        parameter value 21 and infinite degrees of freedom 
     
Test Details (Mean = -0.000179692664482)  
     
     Period Variance Var. Ratio Obs.  
 1  0.00019 --  103  
 2  0.00013  0.67225  102  
 7  5.1E-05  0.26738  97  
 12  3.5E-05  0.18225  92  
 17  2.8E-05  0.14448  87  
 22  2.3E-05  0.11952  82  
 27  1.8E-05  0.09222  77  
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 32  1.8E-05  0.09679  72  
 37  1.8E-05  0.09203  67  
 42  1.6E-05  0.08180  62  
 47  1.6E-05  0.08215  57  
 52  1.2E-05  0.06042  52  
 57  1.2E-05  0.06255  47  
 62  1.0E-05  0.05427  42  
 67  1.4E-05  0.07251  37  
 72  2.2E-05  0.11648  32  
 77  2.6E-05  0.13526  27  
 82  3.1E-05  0.16221  22  
 87  6.0E-05  0.31335  17  
 92  6.1E-05  0.31950  12  
 97  0.00011  0.60127  7  
 102  0.00011  0.59240  2  
     
      
 
 
Table 7.23:    Variance Ratio Test (Original Data) of the BSE Weekly Share Index (2009 – 
2011) 
 
Null Hypothesis: LR_CRISIS_09_11 is a random walk  
Date: 04/22/18   Time: 00:32   
Sample: 1/07/2005 12/30/2016   
Included observations: 104 (after adjustments)  
Standard error estimates assume no heteroskedasticity 
Lags specified as grid: min=2, max=103, step=5  
     
     Joint Tests Value df Probability 
Max |z| (at period 2)*  3.340674  104  0.0174 
Wald (Chi-Square)  1118.244  21  0.0000 
     
Individual Tests    
Period Var. Ratio Std. Error z-Statistic Probability 
 2  0.672420  0.098058 -3.340674  0.0008 
 7  0.203617  0.267261 -2.979793  0.0029 
 12  0.112622  0.367627 -2.413800  0.0158 
 17  0.108201  0.446201 -1.998650  0.0456 
 22  0.099634  0.512944 -1.755291  0.0792 
 27  0.102281  0.571979 -1.569496  0.1165 
 32  0.077534  0.625481 -1.474812  0.1403 
 37  0.087748  0.674760 -1.351965  0.1764 
 42  0.083851  0.720683 -1.271224  0.2036 
 47  0.068913  0.763852 -1.218937  0.2229 
 52  0.080016  0.804711 -1.143248  0.2529 
 57  0.106578  0.843594 -1.059066  0.2896 
 62  0.090533  0.880764 -1.032590  0.3018 
 67  0.100671  0.916427 -0.981342  0.3264 
 72  0.101783  0.950755 -0.944741  0.3448 
 77  0.102171  0.983886 -0.912533  0.3615 
 82  0.093096  1.015938 -0.892677  0.3720 
 87  0.157174  1.047009 -0.804985  0.4208 
 92  0.344767  1.077184 -0.608283  0.5430 
 97  0.659302  1.106537 -0.307895  0.7582 
 102  1.517180  1.135132  0.455612  0.6487 
     
     *Probability approximation using studentized maximum modulus with 
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        parameter value 21 and infinite degrees of freedom 
     
Test Details (Mean = 0.000117237913549)  
     
     Period Variance Var. Ratio Obs.  
 1  0.00016 --  104  
 2  0.00011  0.67242  103  
 7  3.3E-05  0.20362  98  
 12  1.8E-05  0.11262  93  
 17  1.8E-05  0.10820  88  
 22  1.6E-05  0.09963  83  
 27  1.7E-05  0.10228  78  
 32  1.3E-05  0.07753  73  
 37  1.4E-05  0.08775  68  
 42  1.4E-05  0.08385  63  
 47  1.1E-05  0.06891  58  
 52  1.3E-05  0.08002  53  
 57  1.7E-05  0.10658  48  
 62  1.5E-05  0.09053  43  
 67  1.6E-05  0.10067  38  
 72  1.7E-05  0.10178  33  
 77  1.7E-05  0.10217  28  
 82  1.5E-05  0.09310  23  
 87  2.6E-05  0.15717  18  
 92  5.6E-05  0.34477  13  
 97  0.00011  0.65930  8  
 102  0.00025  1.51718  3  
     
      
 
 
Table 7.24:    Variance Ratio Test (Original Data) of the BSE Weekly Share Index (2010 – 
2013) 
 
Null Hypothesis: LR_AUTO_10_13 is a random walk  
Date: 05/18/18   Time: 22:27   
Sample: 1/07/2005 12/30/2016   
Included observations: 182 (after adjustments)  
Standard error estimates assume no heteroskedasticity 
Lags specified as grid: min=10, max=180, step=10  
     
     Joint Tests Value df Probability 
Max |z| (at period 10)*  3.265309  182  0.0195 
Wald (Chi-Square)  240.6631  18  0.0000 
     
Individual Tests    
Period Var. Ratio Std. Error z-Statistic Probability 
 10  0.182776  0.250275 -3.265309  0.0011 
 20  0.091025  0.368394 -2.467399  0.0136 
 30  0.054458  0.457070 -2.068702  0.0386 
 40  0.046854  0.531171 -1.794423  0.0727 
 50  0.036105  0.596141 -1.616889  0.1059 
 60  0.037738  0.654700 -1.469775  0.1416 
 70  0.035366  0.708438 -1.361635  0.1733 
 80  0.032226  0.758378 -1.276110  0.2019 
 90  0.033844  0.805228 -1.199854  0.2302 
 100  0.040337  0.849499 -1.129681  0.2586 
 110  0.038032  0.891575 -1.078955  0.2806 
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 120  0.047133  0.931752 -1.022662  0.3065 
 130  0.055793  0.970268 -0.973141  0.3305 
 140  0.044450  1.007312 -0.948613  0.3428 
 150  0.075438  1.043042 -0.886410  0.3754 
 160  0.083745  1.077588 -0.850284  0.3952 
 170  0.193794  1.111060 -0.725619  0.4681 
 180  0.609050  1.143553 -0.341873  0.7324 
     
     *Probability approximation using studentized maximum modulus with 
        parameter value 18 and infinite degrees of freedom 
     
Test Details (Mean = 2.09454059968e-05)  
     
     Period Variance Var. Ratio Obs.  
 1  8.4E-05 --  182  
 10  1.5E-05  0.18278  173  
 20  7.7E-06  0.09102  163  
 30  4.6E-06  0.05446  153  
 40  4.0E-06  0.04685  143  
 50  3.0E-06  0.03611  133  
 60  3.2E-06  0.03774  123  
 70  3.0E-06  0.03537  113  
 80  2.7E-06  0.03223  103  
 90  2.9E-06  0.03384  93  
 100  3.4E-06  0.04034  83  
 110  3.2E-06  0.03803  73  
 120  4.0E-06  0.04713  63  
 130  4.7E-06  0.05579  53  
 140  3.8E-06  0.04445  43  
 150  6.4E-06  0.07544  33  
 160  7.1E-06  0.08374  23  
 170  1.6E-05  0.19379  13  
 180  5.1E-05  0.60905  3  
     
      
 
 
Table 7.25:    Variance Ratio Test (Original Data) of the BSE Weekly Share Index (2013 – 
2017) 
 
Null Hypothesis: LR_AUTO_13_17 is a random walk  
Date: 05/18/18   Time: 22:27   
Sample: 1/07/2005 12/30/2016   
Included observations: 182 (after adjustments)  
Standard error estimates assume no heteroskedasticity 
Lags specified as grid: min=10, max=180, step=10  
     
     Joint Tests Value df Probability 
Max |z| (at period 10)*  3.220929  182  0.0228 
Wald (Chi-Square)  41.82333  18  0.0012 
     
Individual Tests    
Period Var. Ratio Std. Error z-Statistic Probability 
 10  0.193883  0.250275 -3.220929  0.0013 
 20  0.096003  0.368394 -2.453884  0.0141 
 30  0.068092  0.457070 -2.038873  0.0415 
 40  0.054903  0.531171 -1.779270  0.0752 
 50  0.048403  0.596141 -1.596261  0.1104 
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 60  0.049864  0.654700 -1.451253  0.1467 
 70  0.043371  0.708438 -1.350337  0.1769 
 80  0.037260  0.758378 -1.269472  0.2043 
 90  0.046927  0.805228 -1.183607  0.2366 
 100  0.032630  0.849499 -1.138754  0.2548 
 110  0.046161  0.891575 -1.069836  0.2847 
 120  0.034481  0.931752 -1.036240  0.3001 
 130  0.047655  0.970268 -0.981527  0.3263 
 140  0.059905  1.007312 -0.933271  0.3507 
 150  0.090805  1.043042 -0.871676  0.3834 
 160  0.108926  1.077588 -0.826916  0.4083 
 170  0.177299  1.111060 -0.740465  0.4590 
 180  0.161076  1.143553 -0.733612  0.4632 
     
     *Probability approximation using studentized maximum modulus with 
        parameter value 18 and infinite degrees of freedom 
     
Test Details (Mean = 3.22465639704e-06)  
     
     Period Variance Var. Ratio Obs.  
 1  3.5E-05 --  182  
 10  6.9E-06  0.19388  173  
 20  3.4E-06  0.09600  163  
 30  2.4E-06  0.06809  153  
 40  1.9E-06  0.05490  143  
 50  1.7E-06  0.04840  133  
 60  1.8E-06  0.04986  123  
 70  1.5E-06  0.04337  113  
 80  1.3E-06  0.03726  103  
 90  1.7E-06  0.04693  93  
 100  1.2E-06  0.03263  83  
 110  1.6E-06  0.04616  73  
 120  1.2E-06  0.03448  63  
 130  1.7E-06  0.04766  53  
 140  2.1E-06  0.05990  43  
 150  3.2E-06  0.09081  33  
 160  3.9E-06  0.10893  23  
 170  6.3E-06  0.17730  13  
 180  5.7E-06  0.16108  3  
     
      
 
Table 7.26:    Variance Ratio Test (Bootstrap Signs Test) of the BSE Weekly Share Index 
(2005 – 2007) 
 
Null Hypothesis: LR_CRISIS_05_07 is a martingale  
Date: 05/22/18   Time: 16:21   
Sample: 1/07/2005 12/30/2016   
Included observations: 102 (after adjustments)  
Standard error estimates assume no heteroskedasticity 
Lags specified as grid: min=2, max=104, step=5  
Test probabilities computed using permutation bootstrap: reps=1000, 
        rng=kn, seed=125438277   
     
     Joint Tests Value df Probability 
Max |z| (at period 2)  2.376354  102  0.0190 
Wald (Chi-Square)  13.33951  21  0.9060 
     
Individual Tests    
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Period Var. Ratio Std. Error z-Statistic Probability 
 2  0.764706  0.099015 -2.376354  0.0150 
 7  0.549020  0.269869 -1.671110  0.0510 
 12  0.343137  0.371214 -1.769501  0.0190 
 17  0.266436  0.450554 -1.628138  0.0180 
 22  0.221034  0.517949 -1.503944  0.0160 
 27  0.196078  0.577560 -1.391928  0.0200 
 32  0.176471  0.631583 -1.303913  0.0260 
 37  0.161632  0.681343 -1.230463  0.0290 
 42  0.154995  0.727714 -1.161177  0.0380 
 47  0.136838  0.771304 -1.119094  0.0440 
 52  0.134238  0.812562 -1.065472  0.0750 
 57  0.098727  0.851824 -1.058050  0.0540 
 62  0.090449  0.889357 -1.022707  0.0750 
 67  0.083699  0.925368 -0.990201  0.0820 
 72  0.059913  0.960031 -0.979226  0.0620 
 77  0.042017  0.993485 -0.964265  0.0380 
 82  0.029651  1.025850 -0.945898  0.0260 
 87  0.040568  1.057224 -0.907501  0.0570 
 92  0.036232  1.087694 -0.886066  0.0470 
 97  0.029715  1.117333 -0.868394  0.0430 
 102  0.009612  1.146207 -0.864057  0.0000 
     
          
Test Details (Mean = 0)   
     
     Period Variance Var. Ratio Obs.  
 1  1.00000 --  102  
 2  0.76471  0.76471  101  
 7  0.54902  0.54902  96  
 12  0.34314  0.34314  91  
 17  0.26644  0.26644  86  
 22  0.22103  0.22103  81  
 27  0.19608  0.19608  76  
 32  0.17647  0.17647  71  
 37  0.16163  0.16163  66  
 42  0.15500  0.15500  61  
 47  0.13684  0.13684  56  
 52  0.13424  0.13424  51  
 57  0.09873  0.09873  46  
 62  0.09045  0.09045  41  
 67  0.08370  0.08370  36  
 72  0.05991  0.05991  31  
 77  0.04202  0.04202  26  
 82  0.02965  0.02965  21  
 87  0.04057  0.04057  16  
 92  0.03623  0.03623  11  
 97  0.02971  0.02971  6  
 102  0.00961  0.00961  1  
     
      
 
 
Table 7.27:    Variance Ratio Test (Bootstrap Signs Test) of the BSE Weekly Share Index 
(2007 – 2009) 
 
Null Hypothesis: LR_CRISIS_07_09 is a martingale  
Date: 05/22/18   Time: 16:21   
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Sample: 1/07/2005 12/30/2016   
Included observations: 103 (after adjustments)  
Standard error estimates assume no heteroskedasticity 
Lags specified as grid: min=2, max=104, step=5  
Test probabilities computed using permutation bootstrap: reps=1000, 
        rng=kn, seed=1656063456   
     
     Joint Tests Value df Probability 
Max |z| (at period 2)  3.251587  103  0.0191 
Wald (Chi-Square)  12.43620  21  0.5890 
     
Individual Tests    
Period Var. Ratio Std. Error z-Statistic Probability 
 2  0.679612  0.098533 -3.251587  0.0020 
 7  0.400832  0.268555 -2.231076  0.0070 
 12  0.245955  0.369407 -2.041230  0.0080 
 17  0.168475  0.448361 -1.854586  0.0090 
 22  0.155340  0.515428 -1.638754  0.0170 
 27  0.145631  0.574749 -1.486507  0.0300 
 32  0.106796  0.628510 -1.421146  0.0310 
 37  0.086854  0.678028 -1.346768  0.0260 
 42  0.082293  0.724173 -1.267249  0.0490 
 47  0.059698  0.767551 -1.225067  0.0380 
 52  0.036594  0.808608 -1.191438  0.0090 
 57  0.031170  0.847679 -1.142920  0.0130 
 62  0.025681  0.885029 -1.100889  0.0190 
 67  0.015795  0.920865 -1.068783  0.0050 
 72  0.014024  0.955359 -1.032048  0.0160 
 77  0.014500  0.988651 -0.996813  0.0680 
 82  0.009472  1.020858 -0.970290  0.0670 
 87  0.004575  1.052079 -0.946150  0.0370 
 92  0.004221  1.082401 -0.919972  0.1620 
 97  0.002302  1.111896 -0.897294  0.2670 
 102  0.000381  1.140629 -0.876376  0.2670 
     
          
Test Details (Mean = 0)   
     
     Period Variance Var. Ratio Obs.  
 1  1.00000 --  103  
 2  0.67961  0.67961  102  
 7  0.40083  0.40083  97  
 12  0.24595  0.24595  92  
 17  0.16848  0.16848  87  
 22  0.15534  0.15534  82  
 27  0.14563  0.14563  77  
 32  0.10680  0.10680  72  
 37  0.08685  0.08685  67  
 42  0.08229  0.08229  62  
 47  0.05970  0.05970  57  
 52  0.03659  0.03659  52  
 57  0.03117  0.03117  47  
 62  0.02568  0.02568  42  
 67  0.01579  0.01579  37  
 72  0.01402  0.01402  32  
 77  0.01450  0.01450  27  
 82  0.00947  0.00947  22  
 87  0.00458  0.00458  17  
 92  0.00422  0.00422  12  
 97  0.00230  0.00230  7  
 102  0.00038  0.00038  2  
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     Table 7.28:    Variance Ratio Test (Bootstrap Signs Test) of the BSE Weekly Share Index 
(2009 – 2011) 
 
Null Hypothesis: LR_CRISIS_09_11 is a martingale  
Date: 05/22/18   Time: 16:22   
Sample: 1/07/2005 12/30/2016   
Included observations: 104 (after adjustments)  
Standard error estimates assume no heteroskedasticity 
Lags specified as grid: min=2, max=104, step=5  
Test probabilities computed using permutation bootstrap: reps=1000, 
        rng=kn, seed=2080094944   
     
     Joint Tests Value df Probability 
Max |z| (at period 2)  2.157277  104  0.0400 
Wald (Chi-Square)  12.11833  21  0.6660 
     
Individual Tests    
Period Var. Ratio Std. Error z-Statistic Probability 
 2  0.788462  0.098058 -2.157277  0.0240 
 7  0.541209  0.267261 -1.716640  0.0660 
 12  0.407051  0.367627 -1.612909  0.0740 
 17  0.289593  0.446201 -1.592125  0.0560 
 22  0.258741  0.512944 -1.445106  0.0950 
 27  0.232906  0.571979 -1.341122  0.1270 
 32  0.181490  0.625481 -1.308609  0.1120 
 37  0.177755  0.674760 -1.218574  0.1670 
 42  0.173077  0.720683 -1.147416  0.2300 
 47  0.154255  0.763852 -1.107210  0.2520 
 52  0.153107  0.804711 -1.052420  0.3230 
 57  0.155196  0.843594 -1.001435  0.3970 
 62  0.123449  0.880764 -0.995217  0.3910 
 67  0.082377  0.916427 -1.001305  0.3190 
 72  0.071581  0.950755 -0.976507  0.3780 
 77  0.068432  0.983886 -0.946825  0.4810 
 82  0.046435  1.015938 -0.938605  0.4570 
 87  0.032935  1.047009 -0.923645  0.4650 
 92  0.035953  1.077184 -0.894969  0.6760 
 97  0.025377  1.106537 -0.880787  0.7950 
 102  0.008296  1.135132 -0.873647  0.8360 
     
          
Test Details (Mean = 0)   
     
     Period Variance Var. Ratio Obs.  
 1  1.00000 --  104  
 2  0.78846  0.78846  103  
 7  0.54121  0.54121  98  
 12  0.40705  0.40705  93  
 17  0.28959  0.28959  88  
 22  0.25874  0.25874  83  
 27  0.23291  0.23291  78  
 32  0.18149  0.18149  73  
 37  0.17775  0.17775  68  
 42  0.17308  0.17308  63  
 47  0.15426  0.15426  58  
 52  0.15311  0.15311  53  
 57  0.15520  0.15520  48  
 62  0.12345  0.12345  43  
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 67  0.08238  0.08238  38  
 72  0.07158  0.07158  33  
 77  0.06843  0.06843  28  
 82  0.04644  0.04644  23  
 87  0.03294  0.03294  18  
 92  0.03595  0.03595  13  
 97  0.02538  0.02538  8  
 102  0.00830  0.00830  3  
     
      
Table 7.29:    Variance Ratio Test (Bootstrap Signs Test) of the BSE Weekly Share Index 
(2010 – 2013) 
 
Null Hypothesis: LR_AUTO_10_13 is a martingale  
Date: 05/22/18   Time: 16:23   
Sample: 1/07/2005 12/30/2016   
Included observations: 182 (after adjustments)  
Standard error estimates assume no heteroskedasticity 
Lags specified as grid: min=2, max=180, step=10  
Test probabilities computed using permutation bootstrap: reps=1000, 
        rng=kn, seed=467052424   
     
     Joint Tests Value df Probability 
Max |z| (at period 2)  3.409747  182  0.0110 
Wald (Chi-Square)  13.07869  18  0.4830 
     
Individual Tests    
Period Var. Ratio Std. Error z-Statistic Probability 
 2  0.747253  0.074125 -3.409747  0.0100 
 12  0.417582  0.277900 -2.095782  0.0160 
 22  0.372627  0.387749 -1.617984  0.0790 
 32  0.343407  0.472819 -1.388678  0.1570 
 42  0.306122  0.544785 -1.273673  0.2030 
 52  0.265427  0.608304 -1.207576  0.2470 
 62  0.218717  0.665795 -1.173460  0.2530 
 72  0.172466  0.718703 -1.151426  0.2420 
 82  0.149558  0.767977 -1.107380  0.2660 
 92  0.150024  0.814275 -1.043844  0.3550 
 102  0.133376  0.858079 -1.009958  0.4180 
 112  0.116366  0.899754 -0.982085  0.4730 
 122  0.093677  0.939582 -0.964603  0.5030 
 132  0.065768  0.977789 -0.955454  0.4910 
 142  0.039003  1.014559 -0.947206  0.4440 
 152  0.015038  1.050042 -0.938022  0.2720 
 162  0.005698  1.084365 -0.916944  0.1870 
 172  0.004600  1.117634 -0.890631  0.3860 
     
          
Test Details (Mean = 0)   
     
     Period Variance Var. Ratio Obs.  
 1  1.00000 --  182  
 2  0.74725  0.74725  181  
 12  0.41758  0.41758  171  
 22  0.37263  0.37263  161  
 32  0.34341  0.34341  151  
 42  0.30612  0.30612  141  
 52  0.26543  0.26543  131  
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 62  0.21872  0.21872  121  
 72  0.17247  0.17247  111  
 82  0.14956  0.14956  101  
 92  0.15002  0.15002  91  
 102  0.13338  0.13338  81  
 112  0.11637  0.11637  71  
 122  0.09368  0.09368  61  
 132  0.06577  0.06577  51  
 142  0.03900  0.03900  41  
 152  0.01504  0.01504  31  
 162  0.00570  0.00570  21  
 172  0.00460  0.00460  11  
     
      
 
Table 7.30:    Variance Ratio Test (Bootstrap Signs Test) of the BSE Weekly Share Index 
(2013 – 2017) 
 
Null Hypothesis: LR_AUTO_13_17 is a martingale  
Date: 05/22/18   Time: 16:24   
Sample: 1/07/2005 12/30/2016   
Included observations: 182 (after adjustments)  
Standard error estimates assume no heteroskedasticity 
Lags specified as grid: min=2, max=180, step=10  
Test probabilities computed using permutation bootstrap: reps=1000, 
        rng=kn, seed=298585881   
     
     Joint Tests Value df Probability 
Max |z| (at period 2)  2.520248  182  0.0300 
Wald (Chi-Square)  15.25267  18  0.8820 
     
Individual Tests    
Period Var. Ratio Std. Error z-Statistic Probability 
 2  0.813187  0.074125 -2.520248  0.0090 
 12  0.336996  0.277900 -2.385765  0.0140 
 22  0.366633  0.387749 -1.633443  0.0510 
 32  0.432692  0.472819 -1.199841  0.1070 
 42  0.507064  0.544785 -0.904826  0.2130 
 52  0.546069  0.608304 -0.746223  0.3140 
 62  0.570011  0.665795 -0.645829  0.3770 
 72  0.569292  0.718703 -0.599285  0.4430 
 82  0.556151  0.767977 -0.577946  0.4590 
 92  0.552317  0.814275 -0.549793  0.4880 
 102  0.558500  0.858079 -0.514521  0.5230 
 112  0.563972  0.899754 -0.484609  0.5700 
 122  0.538462  0.939582 -0.491217  0.5860 
 132  0.494339  0.977789 -0.517147  0.6230 
 142  0.431048  1.014559 -0.560788  0.6690 
 152  0.334008  1.050042 -0.634253  0.6820 
 162  0.220594  1.084365 -0.718767  0.6540 
 172  0.094557  1.117634 -0.810143  0.3780 
     
          
Test Details (Mean = 0)   
     
     Period Variance Var. Ratio Obs.  
 1  1.00000 --  182  
 2  0.81319  0.81319  181  
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 12  0.33700  0.33700  171  
 22  0.36663  0.36663  161  
 32  0.43269  0.43269  151  
 42  0.50706  0.50706  141  
 52  0.54607  0.54607  131  
 62  0.57001  0.57001  121  
 72  0.56929  0.56929  111  
 82  0.55615  0.55615  101  
 92  0.55232  0.55232  91  
 102  0.55850  0.55850  81  
 112  0.56397  0.56397  71  
 122  0.53846  0.53846  61  
 132  0.49434  0.49434  51  
 142  0.43105  0.43105  41  
 152  0.33401  0.33401  31  
 162  0.22059  0.22059  21  
 172  0.09456  0.09456  11  
     
      
